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The Navy Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) Community provides a vital, 
sophisticated capability to address increasingly dynamic and unpredictable threats around 
the world. Effective performance in the SWO Community requires a somewhat unique 
set of skills and capabilities, which center on life and work aboard ships at sea. Many 
SWOs find life at sea to be fun and exciting, filled with challenging jobs and 
camaraderie, and a balance that makes the hard work and long hours worthwhile and 
rewarding. Alternatively, for others the sacrifice seems unsustainable, and the SWO 
Community has battled mid- and junior-level officer attrition for many years. 
To help combat such attrition, Community leaders have devised and implemented 
a number of progressive changes to enhance the SWO profession and to help retain 
talent. For several instances, it has recently increased its Department Head Retention 
Bonus, increased compensation to officers selected early for Department Head, and 
organized a number of alternate, parallel career tracks to expand flexibility and options 
regarding sea-shore rotation, education, specialization and other decisions affecting 
retention.  
The goal is to retain, develop and promote the most talented SWOs. The construct 
talent remains somewhat ambiguous, however, and the most “talented” officers appear to 
be those receiving the highest rankings and strongest endorsements on their fitness 
reports (FITREPs). A key problem is, FITREPs are subject to increasing criticism 
regarding bias, subjectivity and foci on tenure over merit and current performance over 
future potential. Indeed, the Navy is in the process of reevaluating its performance 
evaluation process now. Moreover, results from our previous research suggest strongly 
that talent is a highly situated and nuanced concept, with key characteristics likely to 
differ with rank, role, job and other factors that vary over time. Hence it remains 
uncertain whether the talent we retain currently is the best to meet our present, much less 
our future, needs. 
 This qualitative study addresses the issue directly through three research 
questions: 1) What constitutes talent in the SWO Community? 2) Why do some talented 
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people choose to leave the Navy while others choose to stay in? 3) How can we retain 
talent in the Navy? 
Eschewing the idea of using deduction and quantitative analysis through one or 
more top-down theoretic models of talent—approaches that presume a detailed 
understanding of what talent is and how to measure it—we choose instead to employ 
qualitative methods inductively and to build up a grounded understanding of SWO talent. 
Indeed, given the situated and nuanced nature of talent likely to exist, we look to develop 
and articulate an understanding by talking to talented people in the SWO Community 
directly. We all know the saying, “I know talent when I see it,” so we’re looking to 
understand what it is that talented SWOs see when it comes to talent.  
Likewise, instead of speculating about why some people are leaving the SWO 
Community and why others are deciding to stay in the Navy, we ask talented SWOs why 
they’re choosing or considering one path or another, and we ask them also about friends 
and colleagues of theirs, building up similarly a grounded understanding of what they are 
looking for or missing. Far from informal wardroom conversations, broad focus groups or 
like approaches, however, we employ very well-established, grounded theory building 
methods, which provide a systematic, scientific process to develop an understanding 
inductively, from the data themselves. 
Moreover, we focus specifically on people who have completed their junior 
officer (JO) tours, who have been identified as “talented” beyond the current FITREP 
process, and who have made the commitment (i.e., as O3s) to their Department Head 
(DH) tours. This represents a career decision point at which much SWO talent is lost 
historically, hence the perspective of talented officers at this point is highly informative. 
Through independent analysis, we find considerable correspondence between 
participants’ interview responses and the set of Navy Desired Leader Attributes 
(NDLAs), suggesting that SWOs at the O3 level accept and exhibit many desired 
attributes of Navy leaders at their career phase. This is encouraging, and it reflects 
visionary leadership of the Flag Officers developing the NDLAs. Navy Leadership 
should be encouraged to find such good correspondence with its desired attributes. In a 
sense, our results provide independent evidence that the NDLAs are considered important 
and being exhibited at the appropriate time in a SWO’s career. 
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Additional results suggest that the SWO Community is working very well overall; 
that its recently implemented changes are serving their intended purposes; and that many 
talented people are being identified, recognized, promoted and retained as desired. 
Nonetheless, this community is no exception to having room for improvement, and 
through our grounded, independent study, we identify seven significant retention risks: 1) 
talented people not being assigned to challenging jobs; 2) unfavorable interaction with 
Chiefs; 3) unfavorable interaction with Detailers; 4) unfavorable CO/XO interaction; 5) 
lack of command opportunities; 6) difficult family planning; and 7) dissatisfaction with 
sea life. 
Each of these retention risks offers potential for mitigation, and through our 
grounded understanding of the SWOs participating in the study—in addition to sage 
comment and guidance from the experienced SWO Captain serving as our Strategic 
Contact—we offer a set of eight recommendations to help address such risks and to retain 
talent. 
1. Work to assess talent in advance of JOs’ sea tours. We need to know whom our 
talented JOs are, and it could be helpful to gain additional insight into talent before their 
first shipboard assignments. Perhaps some kind of shipboard exercise, simulation or other 
assessment—producing validated indicators of SWO talent aboard ship—can be 
accomplished during BDOC (Basic Division Officer Course), for instance, or we might 
be able to identify some other performance markers stemming from SWO testing, 
commissioning sources or like venues. This could help to mitigate the issue of talented 
officers being assigned to unfulfilling jobs in the first place. 
Additionally, we could implement more consistently a policy of reassigning JOs 
to different jobs periodically during their sea tours. This could be accomplished 
informally or via formal rotation program, and it could be accomplished via assignments 
to different ships or even aboard the same ship throughout an entire JO tour. In either 
case, in addition to giving CO/XO/DHs the opportunity to observe junior officers across a 
variety of roles, demands and requirements, it may benefit also by exposing JOs to 
multiple shipboard jobs—thereby limiting the length of time, if any, that talented people 
remain stuck in unfulfilling jobs.  
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2. Set and enforce expectations of mutual cooperation and respect between JOs 
and Chiefs. Effective JO-Chief interaction is important to successful operations in every 
division aboard ship. However, not all Chiefs appear to be equally supportive of the 
Division Officers (DivOs) for whom they work. Some inherent personality mismatches 
are likely to be inevitable, and some JOs and Chiefs may be comparably more or less 
motivated to learn from and teach one another, respectively. Nonetheless, JOs could be 
taught and motivated to humble themselves and seek to learn from Chiefs, who in turn 
could be taught and motivated to make themselves available and strive to support DivOs. 
To the extent that such teaching and motivation fall short, and talented JOs continue to 
feel unsupported by their Chiefs, this appears to reflect a command shortcoming, which 
could be addressed at a different level (e.g., the Commodore). 
3. Set and enforce expectations of responsive interaction between JOs and 
Detailers. Many JOs express dissatisfaction with Detailer support and mistrust of the 
detailing process. A key manifestation of inadequate support appears to stem from 
unresponsive communication. If Detailers were instructed to interact more responsively, 
then at least the SWOs may not feel as though they are being ignored. This could be as 
simple as business rules (e.g., “every SWO email will be responded to within two 
business days”; “an email will be sent to a SWO within two business days of receiving a 
telephone call”). This all assumes, of course, that the SWOs in question have begun their 
Detailer interactions at the appropriate timepoints and are not experiencing difficulties 
due to their own procrastination and inadequate planning or action. This assumes also, 
clearly, that adequate resources can be made available to support the likely increase in 
Detailer manning that would be required. 
Further, SWO mistrust of the detailing process appears to center on an absence of 
process transparency and possible goal misalignment. Were SWOs able to understand the 
detailing process better, and were they able to attain greater visibility into the larger view 
of jobs needing to be filled, then they may feel more trusting toward the detailing process 
and people. Although a SWO can have faith that the Detailer is doing his or her best to 
balance the needs of the individual with the needs of the Navy, some increased 
transparency may help to reduce his or her level of anxiety. 
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4. Set and enforce expectations of increased mentoring and coaching by COs and 
XOs. Many JOs perceive that their leaders only give orders and provide evaluations of 
recent performance, reflecting negligible motivation for sharing highly valued guidance 
and experience. This represents a challenging issue, however. COs and XOs are military 
commanders, with serious missions to accomplish in an inherently hazardous work 
environment. They require considerable latitude to do so in ways that make sense and 
that fit their leadership styles and experience bases. Nonetheless, a lack of guidance and 
mentoring, combined with toxic leadership and inhospitable command climate, is a 
strong dissatisfier for talented SWOs, and even one toxic CO/XO could potentially drive 
dozens of talented subordinates out of the Navy. Of course, COs and XOs are busy 
people, and burdening them with additional tasks and expectations could become 
counterproductive and undermine their primary objective: effective command at sea. 
An alternate and possibly complementary recommendation centers on metaphoric 
crosspollination. This could be as simple as inviting the CO from a different ship in the 
DESRON to host a leadership question and answer session for an hour, or inviting one or 
more Department Heads from other ships to offer training or simply expand the range of 
social interaction with wardrooms of different ships. The idea is that young JOs could 
gain exposure to a wider variety of leaders—and leadership styles—from different ships, 
and hence benefit from the indirect, cross-command insight, mentoring and coaching that 
could emerge. 
5. Reevaluate the performance evaluation process. Many junior officers seek to 
distinguish themselves through early command, in large part because they do not feel 
well represented by their evaluations, yet they seek to “practice” command in smaller, 
less stressful settings (e.g., something less demanding than as CO of a DDG) also. There 
are two issues here: 1) early command and 2) the performance evaluation process. 
Addressing early command first, since there is only a fixed number of command 
billets, it’s unclear how many smaller or “practice” commands could be established. It’s 
unclear also whether serving as CO of such smaller or “practice” command would 
represent a better experience than serving as a key Department Head or XO under a more 
experienced CO. We leave this question to Navy leaders and policy makers, in addition to 
a topic of future research. 
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In terms of FITREP reevaluation, at the time of this writing, formal efforts to 
transform the performance evaluation process have been underway for over two years. In 
a section below, we consider, independently, how our study participants’ responses 
compare with the Navy Desired Leader Attributes (NDLAs). Such attributes are intended 
to contribute to the growth of Navy leaders by describing the character qualities, 
behaviors and skills expected at different stages of their careers. By recognizing and 
incorporating this temporal dimension into the evaluation process, we can begin to focus 
on JOs’ future potential in addition to their past and current performance. This could also 
serve to lessen the perceived inequity stemming from evaluation bias favoring tenure 
over merit (e.g., people having spent more time in a command receiving higher 
evaluations than their newer shipmates, regardless of performance), and it could help to 
identify and retain talent better. This represents an area of ongoing research. 
For an advance look, we find that many NDLAs are mentioned—independently—
as important character qualities, behaviors and skills by our study participants, and we 
find that such NDLAs apply at their intended target in terms of JO career progression. 
Navy Leadership should be encouraged to find such good correspondence with its desired 
attributes. In a sense, our results provide independent evidence that the NDLAs are 
considered important and being exhibited at the appropriate time in a SWO’s career.  
6. Continue to offer the recently expanded number of career tracks. This appears 
to help address some risk stemming from rigid career timelines and family planning 
difficulties, and the SWO Community should be congratulated for devising and 
implementing it. Nonetheless, life at sea—and away from family—is hard, yet it is 
central to the SWO profession and will likely persist as a driver of talent loss. This 
recommendation blends with Number 8 below but merits mention here first. 
Perhaps we can think of ways to lessen the loss of time with friends and families 
while at sea. In our fathers’ and grandfathers’ Navy, people may have been content with 
reading books, writing letters, and exchanging sea stories with shipmates. In this age of 
ever increasing network bandwidth and computer connectivity, however, many JOs seek 
current, online and synchronous social interaction. Toward this end, even the smaller 
ships could be equipped with higher capacity networking capability, for instance, which 
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would enable people aboard ship to have richer and more frequent communications with 
friends and families back home. 
Rich video conference, chat and social network capabilities are relatively 
common and inexpensive today, and life aboard ship could become less onerous and 
burdensome if people could stay up to date and interact with friends and loved ones using 
such capabilities. Streaming current music, games, movies and television shows could 
enhance people’s experience at sea also. Of course, this would require a budgetary 
commitment to equip ships as such, and people aboard ship would need to have sufficient 
time away from job responsibilities to enjoy activities along these lines, but enriching 
people’s off-duty time could serve us well in terms of retaining talent. 
Perhaps we can also expand our vision in terms of ways to increase the number 
and quality of activities that are available aboard ship. One need spend only a short 
amount of time on a cruise ship, for instance, to appreciate the dramatic difference 
between it and a cruiser or destroyer. Cruise ships and warships clearly have different 
missions and are designed accordingly, but even small efforts to make life at sea more 
enjoyable and accommodating aboard warships could go a long way. Consider, for 
instance, the availability of more diverse, healthier meal options (Dare we use the word 
“cuisine”?) or drinking a glass or two of wine or beer at the end of the day (Such practice 
is permitted in some navies.). Either could represent a welcome ritual, and a commitment 
to adequate downtime and sleep aboard ship could pay dividends—in terms of talent 
retention and safety alike—too. 
7. Work to support pregnant officers. The risk of losing talented people to 
pregnancy is specific to women, who may become unable to finish their sea tours, and 
who may fear becoming uncompetitive relative to their peers. Some women are able to 
plan children around the pockets of shore duty that are sprinkled into their career 
timelines, but such pockets may or may not coincide with the women’s family plans or 
their metaphoric biological clocks, and some talented female officers may fear 
jeopardizing their careers or simply leave the Navy out of frustration. 
 Although the Career Intermission Program represents one approach to addressing 
pregnancy as a retention risk, it has limitations and consequences (e.g., transfer out of 
active duty). An alternate approach (suggested by one of our participants) could involve a 
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“year group rollback system” for female officers looking to have children earlier than the 
pockets of shore duty noted above. If a female JO were to get pregnant before or during a 
sea tour, for instance, then perhaps she could be sent to shore duty and rolled back a year 
group to stay competitive. It would likely require consideration of circumstance and merit 
for each individual case, but an approach along these lines might offer more flexibility to 
service women.  
A related approach (suggested by another of our participants) would involve an 
effort to expand Tricare coverage to include fertility treatments for those who delay 
having kids for family planning. This represents emerging best practice to retain talent in 
tight labor markets (WSJ, 2018), and it could increase the perception that the Navy takes 
care of its own, especially those who do their due diligence to balance Navy service and 
career with family planning. 
8. Finally, train JOs more thoroughly in advance of their sea tours. The relative 
lack of training represents an important dissatisfier. Many JOs perceive that the formal 
(ashore) training received before their sea tours is inadequate, and several participants in 
this study mention the 2017 accidents involving the cruiser Antietam and destroyers 
Fitzgerald and McCain for at least anecdotal support for this perception. After only a 
brief BDOC experience, new JOs go directly to their ships for their first operational tours 
at sea. Other Navy communities (esp. Aviation, Nuclear) have considerable training 
pipelines that officers must complete before their first operational assignments and before 
being entrusted with expensive Navy assets (e.g., aircraft, reactors). In its effort to get 
JOs out to sea quickly, the SWO Community may be sacrificing an opportunity to 
increase SWO competency levels aboard ship and contribute toward talent retention.  
We could consider (re)instituting a lengthy formal training program prior to the 
first sea tour, for instance, or a substantial extension of BDOC may be more efficient, as 
another instance. We could even consider affording JOs a measure of independent self-
study time to begin preparing for shipboard qualifications before the beginning of their 
sea tours. In any case, the JOs are sending a demand signal for increased training in 
advance of their first sea tours, and addressing such signal may provide manifold benefits 
in terms of retention, safety and efficacy. 
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Of course, much work would be required to implement the recommendations 
outlined above, and it is unclear what impact they would have upon the detailing process, 
morale, perceived fairness, recruiting, chain of command, retention and other areas. 
Moreover, some of these recommendations are clearly controversial, and others would 
increase pressure on already strained budgets. Nonetheless, they offer potential to help to 
keep talented SWOs from leaving the Navy. We leave the answers to Navy leaders and 
policy makers, in addition to topics for future research. 
Indeed, through this study we have already identified several promising future 
research topics. More specifically, each of the recommendations proposed above (e.g., 
ways to assess talent in advance of JOs’ sea tours, policy for reassigning JOs to different 
jobs periodically during their sea tours, improving JO-Chief and JO-Detailer interactions) 
can benefit from research to consider alternate approaches and to outline key decisions 
and implementation steps, and some recommendations (esp. informing efforts to 
transform the performance evaluation process) are primed for contribution through 
additional qualitative and quantitative research. Other important topics (e.g., rigid career 
timelines, family planning difficulties, challenges of life at sea, being away from friends 
and family, pregnancy, training, health and sleep) merit further investigation as well. 
There is so much additional knowledge required. Let’s keep going. 
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The Navy Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) Community provides a vital, 
sophisticated capability to address increasingly dynamic and unpredictable threats around 
the world. These dedicated professionals navigate, maintain and fight warships all around 
the globe, every day and night, in any kind of weather, in Harm’s way and in peace. Navy 
surface forces can utilize their own speed, endurance and weapons to project power far 
forward, maintain freedom of navigation through international waters, counter piracy, 
and conduct a host of other critical missions (e.g., antisubmarine warfare, air defense, 
ballistic missile defense, strike). 
Effective performance in the SWO Community requires a somewhat unique set of 
skills and capabilities, which center on life and work aboard ships at sea. Although work 
aboard ships is organized across various departments and divisions, everyone must work 
together, in an integrated manner, to ensure safe passage and mission success while 
underway. This requires strong discipline and hard work, where mid- and junior-level 
officers, for instance, devote long hours to standing watches, leading departments and 
divisions, earning warfare and shipboard qualifications (e.g., Officer of the Deck [OOD], 
SWO, Tactical Action Officer [TAO], Engineering Officer of the Watch [EOOW]), and 
maintaining their health and fitness with the remaining time available. 
Many SWOs find life at sea to be fun and exciting, filled with challenging jobs 
and camaraderie, and a balance that makes the hard work and long hours worthwhile and 
rewarding. Alternatively, for others the sacrifice seems unsustainable, and the SWO 
Community has battled mid- and junior-level officer attrition for many years. To help 
combat such attrition, Community leaders have devised and implemented a number of 
progressive changes to enhance the SWO profession and to help retain talent. For several 
instances, it has recently increased its Department Head Retention Bonus, increased 
compensation to officers selected early for Department Head, and organized a number of 
alternate, parallel career tracks to expand flexibility and options regarding sea-shore 
rotation, education, specialization and other decisions affecting retention (NAVADMIN 
206-16, 2016; SWO Community, 2016). 
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The goal is to retain, develop and promote the most talented SWOs (SWO 
Community, 2016). The construct talent remains somewhat ambiguous, however, and the 
most “talented” officers appear to be those receiving the highest rankings and strongest 
endorsements on their fitness reports (FITREPs). A key problem is, FITREPs are subject 
to increasing criticism regarding bias, subjectivity (Bjerke et al., 1987; Donaldson, 1996) 
and foci on tenure over merit and current performance over future potential (Faram & 
Tilghman, 2017).  
Moreover, results from our previous research (Nissen & Tick, 2017) suggest 
strongly that talent is a highly situated and nuanced concept. Far from general and 
monolithic, talent seems to be aligned with a person’s knowledge and capability within 
an organization setting. This will vary clearly across warfare communities (e.g., SWO 
talent will involve different elements than IWC talent), but characteristics of talent will 
likely also differ with rank (e.g., junior [JOs] vs. senior officers [SOs]), role (e.g., leading 
a department or division vs. standing watch), job (Kraus, 2016) and other factors that 
vary over time. Hence it remains uncertain whether the talent we retain currently is the 
best to meet our present, much less our future, needs.  
 This qualitative study addresses the issue directly through three research 
questions: 1) What constitutes talent in the SWO Community? 2) Why do some talented 
people choose to leave the Navy while others choose to stay in? 3) How can we retain 
talent in the Navy?  
Eschewing the idea of using deduction and quantitative analysis through one or 
more top-down theoretic models of talent—approaches that presume a detailed 
understanding of what talent is and how to measure it—we choose instead to employ 
qualitative methods inductively and to build up a grounded understanding of SWO talent. 
Indeed, given the situated and nuanced nature of talent likely to exist, we look to develop 
and articulate an understanding of SWO talent by talking to talented people in the SWO 
Community directly. We all know the saying, “I know talent when I see it,” so we’re 
looking to understand what it is that talented SWOs see when it comes to talent. 
On the surface, this may appear somewhat biased and circular: we’re asking 
SWOs who have been identified as “talented” about their perceptions to build up a 
grounded understanding of SWO talent. Clearly the perceptions are from people for 
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whom the current performance evaluation system is working. Nonetheless, every study 
must begin somewhere. We choose to begin with people who are considered to be 
“talented” at present, and we focus on those who have elected to stay in the Navy. This 
provides us with insight into the components of talent: the kinds of attributes, traits, 
attitudes and behaviors exhibited by “talented” SWOs.  
For comparison1, a follow on study could examine people who are not considered 
to be “talented,” or for contrast, we could seek out the perceptions of “talented” people 
who have elected to leave the Navy, and the kinds of talent attributes, traits, attitudes and 
behaviors identified here can inform top-down quantitative studies addressing large 
populations. Hence this study lays down a foundation of talent components for 
comparison, contrast and further investigation. 
Moreover, not all of the talented SWOs in our sample frame are necessarily happy 
with how they’ve been treated, and some people on the margin may have chosen to leave 
the Navy had certain (unknown to us) circumstances been even slightly different. Thus, 
their perceptions provide additional insight into the kinds of motivators and dissatisfiers 
that they and others face. This can help to inform Navy leaders interested in accentuating 
motivators and mitigating dissatisfiers in order to help retain more talented people.  
Toward this end, instead of speculating about why some people are leaving the 
SWO Community and why others are deciding to stay in the Navy, we ask talented 
SWOs why they’re choosing or considering one path or another, and we ask them also 
about friends and colleagues of theirs—those who have elected to stay in the Navy as 
well as those who have decided to leave—building up similarly a grounded 
understanding of what they are looking for or missing. Far from informal wardroom 
conversations, broad focus groups or like approaches, however, we employ very well-
established, grounded theory building methods, which provide a systematic, scientific 
process to develop an understanding inductively, from the data themselves. 
Moreover, we focus specifically on people who have completed their junior 
officer (JO) tours, who have been identified as “talented” beyond the current FITREP 
process (e.g., independently, by an experienced SWO Captain serving as our Strategic 
                                                 
1 Three complementary studies could address the other quadrants of the 2x2 matrix: talented vs untalented 
and staying in vs leaving the Navy. 
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Contact), and who have made the commitment (i.e., as O3s) to their Department Head 
(DH) tours. This represents a career decision point at which much SWO talent is lost 
historically, hence the perspective of talented officers at this point is highly informative.  
This qualitative approach exhibits no prejudice or judgment against quantitative 
methods. Indeed, we are conducting a quantitative companion study in conjunction with 
this one. Every research method has its comparative strengths and weaknesses, which are 
known well. Quantitative methods offer the power of numbers and statistical analysis, for 
instance, and they are able to address large volumes of data, generally quite quickly. 
Internal validity and reliability are relatively strong generally with quantitative methods, 
and researchers have an easier job of claiming to be “objective.” However, quantitative 
methods have a difficult time addressing “how” and “why” research questions, and even 
many “what” questions can be troublesome. Notice that the three research questions 
centering this study include a “what,” and “why” and a “how.” 
Metaphorically, quantitative methods are air campaigns. They strike quickly, 
generally from the top down, and can cover great areas, generally with comparatively 
little effort by the warriors conducting the missions. However, they leave many targets 
untouched, can inflict collateral damage, and are rarely effective alone. Campaigns in the 
Middle East over the past 15 years help validate this characterization. Indeed, experience 
suggests that lasting results require ground campaigns also, some aspects of which 
involve close, even house-to-house combat. This is metaphoric qualitative research: 
getting on the ground and close to data, understanding them in depth, despite their 
inherently messy and disorganized nature. There is a time and place for both research 
methods. Given our interest in trying to define and understand talent as a situated and 
nuanced concept, this approach seems most appropriate at this stage of our study 
campaign. 
The balance of this report begins with some background information regarding 
the SWO Community, after which we elaborate on our qualitative research method. The 
bulk of the report articulates our qualitative data analysis and findings, which we 
summarize through a set of recommendations and conclusions to complete the report. 
Three appendices are included with the qualitative instruments used in this study.  
 5 
II. BACKGROUND 
In this section we summarize very briefly the nature and composition of the SWO 
Community. We also summarize some relevant previous research on retention and talent.  
 
A. SWO COMMUNITY 
The Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) profession is comparatively ancient, dating 
back to the beginning of naval warfare, and relatively homogeneous. Paradoxically, 
proficiency at surface warfare was such a fundamental of naval skill, that it was not 
recognized as a distinct warfare community until the early 1970s. Although the moniker 
applies to anyone who has earned the SWO Pin, by “SWO” we refer principally to Navy 
officers that lead and operate surface combatant vessels, especially those designed for 
surface warfare with their own weapons. This would exclude submarines, which operate 
submerged, aircraft carriers, which fight with airplanes, and other craft that do not use 
their own weapons in a surface warfare role. Hence in the current era, this points us 
principally toward cruisers and destroyers (CRU-DES), littoral combat ships (LCS), 
frigates and like vessels, as well as the various sub-types that constitute the Surface 
Navy’s Amphibious Force. 
SWOs have traditionally followed a relatively rigid career path, with sea-shore 
assignments and rotations mapped out explicitly from JO to SO (SWO Community, 
2016). The clear emphasis of initial assignments and rotations centers on gaining 
experience and proficiency at sea, typically with the first four years or so serving aboard 
ship. After completing the Basic Division Officer Course (BDOC), officers report to their 
first division officer (DivO) tour, during which time they would promote to Lieutenant 
Junior Grade (O2). The Advanced Division Officer Course (ADOC) would generally 
precede their second DivO tour, during which time they would likely face one or two 
Department Head screening boards and promote to the rank of Lieutenant (O3). 
Throughout these years at sea, they would also stand watches and earn their OOD and 
SWO qualifications. Exact career paths may differ a bit, and some officers may earn 
additional qualifications (e.g., TAO, EOOW) as well. 
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A shore tour of roughly three years follows these two DivO tours, and those 
previously selected would then complete Department Head School before returning to sea 
for one or two Department Head tours (with a possibility of early command) as they are 
screened for Lieutenant Commander (O4). Signing up for the Department Head tour(s) 
generally involves a major commitment of additional service time in the Navy, and this 
has posed a retention challenge. Indeed, the Navy O3s selected to serve as Department 
Heads appear to comprise a particularly insightful population to study in terms of SWO 
talent and retention. Having been selected to become Department Heads, the Navy clearly 
views them as particularly valuable human capital, and facing a major commitment of 
additional service time, these officers have an important decision to make in terms of 
career and lifestyle. 
As noted above, this traditional, rigid career path for JOs has expanded recently 
with multiple tracks that offer increased flexibility. The traditional path remains an option 
still, but officers now have four alternate tracks to follow as JOs. 1) The Accelerated 
Warfighter track may involve a single, longer DivO tour at sea followed by Warfare 
Tactics Instructor (WTI) training and subsequent WTI utilization as an O3. 2) The 
Enhanced Readiness track includes the two, traditional DivO sea tours followed by 
assignment on shore either teaching and training or pursuing graduate education at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) or elsewhere.  
3) The Accelerated Skillset Building track begins with a single DivO tour 
followed by time on shore for developing skills through graduate education before 
embarking on the second tour at sea. 4) The Nuclear track has the first DivO tour 
followed by time on shore at the Naval Nuclear Power School and Nuclear Power 
Training Unit. The second DivO tour is in the engineering plant of an aircraft carrier.  
Additionally, within each of these tracks, officers have an opportunity to pursue 
the Career Intermission Program (CIP), which provides a one time, temporary transition 
from active duty to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to allow service members to 
pursue personal or professional goals outside the service while providing a way for their 
return to active duty. JOs retain their benefits during this period and then rejoin active 
duty to continue their SWO careers. Only time and empiric evidence will tell whether 
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these alternate career tracks increase retention of talented SWOs. We begin gaining some 
insight into this question through the present qualitative study. 
 
B. RETENTION AND TALENT RESEARCH 
Retention in the Military has been studied for many decades (Singer & Morton, 
1969; Rocco et al., 1977; Hurlock & Montague, 1982; Cooke & Quester, 1992; Sullivan, 
1998; Christensen et al., 2002). A great many retention studies look backward, trying to 
make sense of historic data. Makarenko (2014), for instance, identifies a positive 
correlation between unemployment in the US economy and SWO retention. This suggests 
that with the economy near full employment today, retention may be more of a challenge 
than during the period of and following the Great Recession.  
Similarly, Clark (2016) identifies a positive correlation between the timing of 
graduate education and retention of SWO Department Heads who earn a masters degree 
after five years of service: they are more likely to retain than those who don’t or who earn 
such degrees before or earlier in their careers. This suggests that graduate education 
during a SWO’s career can represent an effective retention tactic. Further, Mundell 
(2016) identifies a lower retention rate for female officers than for their male 
counterparts, but no difference is found in promotion rates to O4. Although the study 
does not focus on SWOs specifically, it suggests that men and women may have 
somewhat different career and education needs. Like the study above, graduate education 
also shows a positive correlation with officer retention. 
Alternatively, some promising studies estimate retention models for officers in 
general (Parcell et al., 2003), in communities such as aviation and surface warfare 
(Parcell & MacIlvaine, 2005), and to assess diversity (Kraus, 2013). By developing 
models, such studies equip us to look prospectively, which is important. We’re working 
to address future talent losses, not simply to understand those that took place in the past. 
One relatively recent study (Snodgrass & Kohlman, 2014) also looks 
prospectively. Instead of developing models from historic data, however, it grounds data 
by asking sailors directly about their plans in terms of staying in or leaving the Navy. 
This direct, prospective approach aligns well with our interest in developing a grounded 
understanding. Although the present study focuses more on talent than retention, there is 
clear complementation. 
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Nonetheless, the idea of asking sailors directly is not new, for the Navy 
administers broad surveys routinely. For instance, until being discontinued several years 
ago, the ARGUS survey (Frith, 2007) would ask sailors about their quality of life and like 
questions. The Career Viewpoint Survey (CNP PAO, 2014), as another instance, 
similarly invites sailors to provide advance input regarding career decisions prior to key 
milestones (esp. end of duty obligated service, end of minimum service requirement, 
projected rotation date). Soliciting advance input seems important2, particularly if the 
Navy is sufficiently agile to do something to prevent talented people from leaving based 
on the results.  
Although such surveys are advertised as voluntary and confidential, it is unclear 
whether sailors have complete trust in the confidentiality of an official Navy system or 
whether they feel that their inputs matter (Anonymous, 2015). As explained in the next 
section, our approach of conducting interviews anonymously—for research purposes—
and destroying any personally identifiable information, helps to bridge the confidentiality 
barrier. Plus, we focus on one community at a time, with a more situated and 
concentrated lens, to help convey the potential visibility of our results. 
Talent remains a challenging topic of study, however (Corley et al., 2015). A 
decade ago, research and consulting in this area were deemed problematic, with little data 
to support practitioner claims (Lewis & Heckman, 2006). Later review research noted 
significant progress, but issues with clear definitions and conceptual boundaries remain 
(Collings & Mellahi, 2009). This theme continues with more recent, extensive literature 
reviews (Tarique & Schuller, 2012). 
 Alternatively, a promising link established with knowledge management 
(Schroevers & Hendriks, 2012) helps to bring considerable academic rigor and successful 
practitioner experience to bear on the talent management topic, which is consistent with 
the Navy’s own knowledge management practices: “Knowledge management is the 
alignment of people and processes, enabled by technology” (DON CIO, 2016). This 
suggests strongly that talent is not some universal state or trait. Rather, it appears to be 
highly situated and nuanced—far from general and monolithic—that is dependent, for 
instance, upon the specific processes and technologies associated with the knowledge 
                                                 
2 The Navy also administers the Career Viewpoint Exit Survey to members as they leave the service. 
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required for a person to exhibit talent. A “talented” person in one domain may represent 
an “untalented” person in another.  
Consider, for example, a Chess grand master—a truly talented person in the 
domain of Chess—who is left stranded in the middle of the Amazon Jungle. Without 
considerable training and experience with jungle survival, would such person even live 
through a single day? Likewise, take an Amazon Jungle native—a truly talented person in 
the domain of jungle survival—and enroll him or her in a Chess tournament. Without 
considerable training and experience with Chess, would such person even win a single 
game? Nissen (2014) goes further, explaining how the balanced interaction between 
people, processes, organizations and technologies is key. This perspective gives ever 
greater credence to our bottom-up, situated, grounded approach to understanding talent, 
beginning with the SWO:  talent seems highly likely to differ tremendously across 
organizations, domains and circumstances. 
Indeed, contemporaneous and complementary research within the Navy (Palmer, 
2017) views talent as a tripartite construct comprised of skills (innate and learned), 
performance, and potential for improvement and innovation. The researchers refer to the 
three parts as technical capacity, process maturity, and absorptive capacity, respectively. 
They go further, defining Navy Quality (personnel) as the degree to which there is a 
correlation and alignment between an individual’s talent and the job requirements (p. 8). 
This parallels, complements and reinforces our proposition that talent is nuanced and 
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
In this section we elaborate on our research method. As noted in the introduction, 
we seek a direct, grounded understanding of SWO talent, so we employ very well-
established, grounded theory building methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). Such methods equip us to develop an understanding inductively, from the 
data themselves, as opposed to relying upon a deductive, top-down model likely to be too 
general and coarse for our situated and nuanced concept talent. 
Moreover, it provides a systematic, scientific process for qualitative research, one 
that both guides and encourages repeated iteration of data collection and analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Such repeated iteration is noted widely as key to grounding theory in 
the data of a qualitative study (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and enables us to focus 
persistently on the SWO Community as a potentially unique and revelatory case to study 
(Yin, 1994). Results from this case study could then become even more useful in 
comparison with other Navy communities as complementary and contrasting cases, 
offering potential to elucidate insights unattainable through other research methods. 
The site selected for this study provides a rich environment for investigating SWO 
talent. We’re able to build upon contemporaneous work (Palmer, 2017) investigating why 
a seeming large and unacceptable number of SWOs are leaving the Navy after 
completing their minimum service requirement (MSR). This work parallels ours with a 
situated and nuanced perspective for talent, as noted above, and it seeks to develop a 
tripartite model.  
We’re able to build further upon our recent qualitative study of talent in the 
Information Warfare Community (Nissen & Tick, 2017), which involved qualitative 
interviews with information warriors while they were studying at the NPS. This enabled 
us to solicit their prospective input regarding factors that could influence their future 
decisions to leave or stay in the Navy. Further, students at NPS (and like education 
institutions) have had an opportunity to detach from the demands of everyday Fleet work 
and to reflect upon their careers—past and future—over 18 months or more while in 
school. This enables study participants to think over the longer term, with fewer, 
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everyday, pressing issues to contend with. This arguably serves very well our research 
purpose of understanding SWO talent as a revelatory case.  
Studying a revelatory case such as this represents theoretical sampling (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967) and makes it suitable for analytic generalization (Yin, 1994). As 
demonstrated several years back in the context of strategic learning (Thomas et al., 2001: 
332), this calls in part for case selection of “a unique exemplar of a particular 
phenomenon to bring key dimensions to light.” Through study of this revelatory case, we 
seek to bring the situated and nuanced nature of talent to light and to illuminate patterns 
with potential to inform retention. 
We employ three techniques for data collection: 1) document review, 2) strategic 
contact, and 3) interview. Briefly, document review provides important background 
information about the SWO Community. It also helps the Investigator to ask informed 
interview questions. Additionally, the Researcher has candid, confidential and sustained 
access to a Strategic Contact (i.e., a senior, experienced SWO). This senior naval officer 
is very experienced with military organizations and warfare processes in general, and he 
has considerable experience with surface warfare in particular. Such experience includes 
serving as Operations Officer (OpsO) on a DDG during his Department Head (DH) Tour, 
Executive Officer (XO) on another DDG, Commanding Officer (CO) on a third DDG and 
CO on a CG, in addition to numerous, impressive staff and shore assignments. This data-
collection technique complements the other modes well. The Strategic Contact represents 
a ready source of military grounding and SWO perspective for consultation by the 
Investigator over the course of the study, and this naval officer knows talent when he sees 
it. 
Semi-structured interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 1995) comprise the central method 
for collecting our qualitative data. Although we do pose a small number of common 
questions to all participants, such questions are very open-ended, asking participants to 
tell about their experiences, feelings, observations and perceptions. We want to hear what 
the participants have to say—in their own words—not impose a bunch of theoretic, 
survey questions. Further, the interviews are conducted with probing (Nelson et al., 2000) 
and snowballing (Reich & Kaarst-Brown, 1999) techniques, and they continue until 
theoretical saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) is reached. Because we focus in particular 
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upon SWO talent, which is a relatively narrow topic, such saturation is reached after the 
first set of interviews, indicating sufficiency in terms of the sample frame. Each interview 
involves about one hour of oral interaction, often with follow up via email, telephone and 
additional meetings. 
It is important to reemphasize that this is a qualitative study, not a quantitative 
analysis, and our interest is much more toward theory building than theory testing. 
Hence, as noted above, we perform theoretical sampling (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), not 
statistical sampling, and we pursue analytic generalization (Yin, 1994), not statistical 
generalization. As such, we adhere to very well-established procedures for qualitative 
data collection and analysis (Denzin, 1994). Such procedures do not dictate that we 
attempt to develop large, random samples.  
Quite to the contrary, we look for a small sample that will be informative, that we 
can understand in depth, and that will reveal both similarities and differences across 
participants. Additionally, we work deliberately to select participants who are likely to 
provide the kind of grounded data that we seek through interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 
1995). Toward these ends, our recruitment process emphasizes volunteer participants. 
The idea is that people who volunteer are likely have something to say, both positive and 
negative. This helps to ensure smooth, candid, flowing interviews, and it increases the 
likelihood of collecting data that are considered important by the participants, particularly 
as our interview techniques enable us to probe and home in on different topics across the 
various participants. This provides considerable contrast to mandatory surveys with 
standard questions. Our recruitment script is included in Appendix A for reference. 
 Nonetheless, we ensure that our sample frame focuses on SWOs viewed as 
“talented” by the Navy, homing in on O3s who are eligible and have been selected to 
serve as Department Heads, who have been identified as “talented” beyond the current 
FITREP process (e.g., by our Strategic Contact), and who have made the commitment to 
their Department Head (DH) tours. We also ensure that we collect the same background 
information from each participant, so we have a common basis of comparison. This is the 
same background information used in a companion quantitative study, so we can 
compare qualitative and quantitative findings and results. The background information 
questionnaire is included in Appendix B for reference too. 
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Plus, we further ensure that we ask at least some of the same interview questions 
to all participants, so we establish a base set of responses for comparison and contrast. 
Most study participants answer these questions in writing before their interviews. This 
streamlines the process and provides a good basis for asking other questions through 
probing and homing in on different topics across the various participants. The common 
set of interview questions is included in Appendix C for reference as well.  
To summarize the sample frame, all study participants are assigned currently (or 
were assigned recently) to the NPS for graduate education, and all have been identified as 
“talented” beyond the current FITREP process (i.e., by our Strategic Contact). As noted 
above, such NPS students are highly suitable for this study, because the investigators are 
collocated on campus with participants, who have an opportunity to detach from the 
demands of everyday Fleet work and to reflect upon their careers—past and future—over 
18 months or more while in school.  
It is important to note that these are not the typical kinds of students used in much 
academic research. Indeed, far from the inexperienced college freshmen who participate 
in myriad psychology, marketing and other studies—the external validity of which is 
wholly suspect—all participants in our sample frame are mid-grade military officers 
(O3), with five to seven years of military service, who have come to the NPS with 
leadership experience directly from operational tours at sea. These people know the 
Navy, and their incorporation in our sample frame enhances the external validity of this 
study greatly. 
On the other hand, this whole sample frame reflects some intentional bias: All 
study participants are relatively junior officers (O3). These O3s have reached career 
points at which many talented officers choose to leave the Navy—yet all of our 
participants have chosen to stay in through their DH tours—so this represents a very 
appropriate group to study. Nonetheless, as suggested above, it could be very insightful to 
conduct a paired qualitative study to understand the talent, needs and motives of their 
peers who have chosen to leave the Navy. We leave such study to subsequent research. 
Further, each of our study participants has elected to attend graduate school 
before the DH tour instead of serving on a shore assignment elsewhere (e.g., supporting 
Fleet operations). Some may contend that our participants reflect less talent and 
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motivation than such peers. This highlights the potential for an insightful follow on study 
to examine the differences between NPS SWOs and their “talented” peers in alternate 
shore assignments, and we leave such study to subsequent research3. 
To enhance candid responses, and to reassure participants regarding anonymity, 
we choose not to use a tape or video recorder for interviews. Nonetheless, extensive notes 
are taken and summarized immediately following each interview, and collocation on the 
NPS campus enables the Investigator to follow up with interviewees where deemed 
necessary to clarify issues, to delve more deeply into topics of interest, or simply to 
verify facts, notes and comments. 
In terms of coding, following Gioia and colleagues (1994) in part, we employ a 
multistage analytic approach to data collection, analysis and interpretation. In the primary 
stage, data collected and analyzed through the course of our interviews lead to first order 
coding (van Maanen, 1979), accomplished in a manner comparable to open coding 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990), which reflects terms used directly by organization participants. 
In other words, adhering to our grounded approach, we employ in vivo codes in the 
primary stage, using terms from the interviews themselves to code each passage and 
section. This helps to keep the coding process as close as possible to the data. 
Investigator reactions and analyses generate corresponding first order interpretations, 
which are meaningful to organization participants also. Where warranted by theoretical 
sampling, many first order interpretations may lead us to additional data collection and 
analysis at the same level, reflecting terms used directly by organization participants. 
This first order analysis grounds our interpretations in the data. 
In the secondary stage, we treat first order interpretations as “data” for second 
order analysis. This second order analysis augments its first order counterpart with 
theoretical insight and comparison, bringing in the investigator’s perspective that is 
informed by the literature, in a manner comparable to axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). Gioia and colleagues (1994: 367) explain the benefits of using such a multistage 
                                                 
3 Indeed, some Navy communities appear to view officer time spent at the NPS negatively. Some 
(anonymous) sources, for instance, have asserted that the most talented SWOs eschew graduate education 
and choose instead shore assignments that benefit the Fleet directly, arguing that such choice is career 
enhancing. However, a graduate degree is notably important for promotion to O6, and officers electing 
graduate school assignments may be more foresightful than their peers. This presents an opportunity to 
conduct a paired study. In either case, as noted below our O6 Strategic Contact helps us to identify a pool 
of “talented” SWOs, regardless of whether their NPS choice is career limiting or foresightful. 
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approach. They include exposing and integrating different aspects of the phenomena of 
study that are revealed separately through first versus second order analysis and 
interpretation.  
 
Although informant views can reveal the rich means or methods by which members can 
construct reality … they usually do not address the deep structure of experience. 
Similarly, although the researcher views tend to gloss the richness of lived experience, 
they place in bas-relief the dimensions or structure of phenomena. Because the knower 
and known are interdependent in this process of understanding, however, the most 
desirable approach is to triangulate insider and outsider views. 
 
As with the first interpretation stage, these second order interpretations may lead 
us in turn to collect and analyze additional data, to refine our first order interpretations, to 
augment our second order analysis, and so forth. This second order analysis bridges 
grounded data and interpretations with theory, and it helps us with the emergence of 
themes, accomplished in a manner comparable to selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). 
Additionally, regarding the Investigator’s background and biases, he is a tenured 
full professor of Information Science and of Management at the NPS, and although he is 
a Navy civilian, he comes to the study independently and without operational military 
experience. This allows a relatively fresh look at the SWO Community, but one that 
includes considerable familiarity and experience with knowledge, talent and retention in 
industry and other sectors outside the Military, in addition to many years of research 
addressing diverse aspects of military organization, personnel, training, education and 
operations. Hence the Investigator is neither a jaded insider or a naïve outsider.  
Further, the Investigator comes to the study with no particular statement to make 
or point to prove. Rather, he comes seeking to understand SWO talent inductively, from a 
grounded perspective, and to elucidate possible approaches to retaining talented SWO 
personnel. Hence initial coding of data is conducted in a manner that lets the data speak 
for themselves and that uses study participants’ own terms. This helps to ensure that 
initial interpretations are both grounded firmly in the data and meaningful to organization 
participants. 
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Finally, in addition to the well-accepted methods and techniques outlined above, 
the study also employs many of the proven tactics for qualitative research outlined by 
Miles and Huberman (1994: 262-276), which include taking a low profile, sampling 
people with different views, triangulating across multiple data-collection techniques, 
multiple verification efforts, and seeking an emic perspective (Bernard, 1998). Such 
tactics serve to mitigate potential bias (e.g., stemming from a single Investigator). 
Moreover, repeated member checking (Denzin, 1994) is accomplished through periodic 
interaction with our Strategic Contact and follow up with the study participants. 
Comments pertaining to the interview summaries and findings are also received from the 
Strategic Contact, participants in the study, experienced SWOs and other researchers, and 
a preliminary summary of study findings and implications is shared with the participants 





























In this section we report the study results. We begin by summarizing the 
backgrounds of our study participants. We then summarize the key first order codes 
applied to our interview data. This is followed by second order analysis and the 
emergence of themes from our qualitative study. The section concludes with summary 
discussion and a set of recommendations for leaders and policy makers, after which we 
include some comparison of interview transcripts and codes with the set of Navy Desired 
Leader Attributes. 
 
A. PARTICIPANT BACKGROUNDS 
In this section we summarize the backgrounds of our study participants. The 
corresponding data are collected through the background questionnaires noted above and 
included in Appendix A for reference. The participant background information is 
summarized in Table 1. To help preserve anonymity, we have stripped a few fields from 
the table as presented, yet we include mean and mode summaries where available and 
appropriate, which help to characterize the sample frame as a whole. We also refer to 
participants via anonymous symbols (e.g., P1701) instead of their names. 
 
Table 1. Participant Background Information 
 
 
This represents a very homogeneous sample. All participants are Navy officers. 
All were commissioned between 2010 and 2012. All have achieved the rank O3, have 
completed their SWO DivO tours, have been selected for Department Head tours, are 
pursuing graduate degrees at the NPS (spanning a variety of curricula), and intend to stay 
Question P1701 P1702 P1703 P1704 P1705 P1706 P1707 P1708 P1709 P1710 P1711 Mean Mode
1 Date of Commissioning 2011 2011 2012 2012 2010 2010 2011 2010 2011 2011 2010 2011
2 Commissioning source USNA USNA ROTC USNA OCS OCS USNA ROTC OCS USNA ROTC USNA
3 Prior Enlisted N Y N N Y N N N N N Y N
4 Undergraduate College attended USNA
5 Year of graduation from college 2011 2011 2012 2012 2009 2011 2010 2010 2011 2010 2011
6 College Major STEM
7 Undergraduate GPA NR
8 Graduate degree N
9 Rank at commissioning O1
10 Designator at entry SWO SWO SWO SWO SWO SWO SWO SWO SWO SWO SWO SWO
11 Married, at commissioning date N
12 Dependent children, at commissioning date N
13 Married, at current date N
14 Dependent children, at current date N
15 Current rank O3 O3 O3 O3 O3 O3 O3 O3 O3 O3 O3 O3
16 Current designator 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110 1110
17 NPS Degree (obtained or sought) MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS MS
18 NPS Curriculum Various
19 Stay in or leave Navy Stay Stay Stay Stay Stay Stay Stay Stay Stay Stay Stay Stay
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in the Navy. These appear to be the kinds of people that the Navy values and would like 
to retain. Their thoughts, experiences, needs and considerations should thus be very 
relevant and insightful in the present study. 
Looking at the mean (for quantitative data) and mode (for qualitative data) shown 
at the right of the table, we see that our average participant was commissioned in 2011, 
with most coming from the US Naval Academy (USNA). Only a few of these officers 
were prior enlisted, and although we do not reveal each participant’s undergraduate 
institution or major (for privacy reasons), all were commissioned (as O1 SWOs) right 
after college. Nearly all were unmarried and without children when commissioned, and 
most remain single and childless.  
 
B. FIRST ORDER ANALYSIS 
In this section we summarize the key first order codes and interpretations applied 
to our interview data. We begin by elaborating further on the coding and analytic process.  
1. Coding and Analytic Process Elaboration 
As explained above, first order in vivo codes correspond to terms that are used 
directly by and that are meaningful to organization participants. They also reflect 
Investigator interpretations and highlight problems, issues, expectations, goals and like 
considerations that seem important in terms of illuminating the nature of SWO talent and 
participants’ thoughts regarding whether to leave or stay in the Navy. They are important 
in their own right, grounding our interpretations in the data, but they also provide fodder 
for our direct interpretation and second order analysis. 
As explained above also, we receive participants’ background questionnaires and 
answers to common questions in advance of the interviews. This streamlines the 
interview process and provides a good basis for asking deeper and individualized 
questions through probing and homing in on different topics across the various 
participants. We read through each participant’s inputs, highlighting all of the terms and 
statements that appear to have bearing on our research questions. Then we read through 
all participants’ highlighted inputs, looking for common elements in addition to extreme 
responses. Common elements help to establish a basis of cross sample expectations, goals 
and like considerations, whereas extreme responses can signal problems, issues and like 
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concerns that may underlie a potential retention risk. Of course, anything related to talent 
is highlighted, but we pay attention in particular to the associated stories, terms, actions 
and characteristics. 
As explained above further, we take notes during the interviews, which we 
formalize immediately afterward. These notes represent our focused conversations with 
participants—predicated upon the background information and common questions—
through which we concentrate on topics associated with such first level codes. Our 
interview transcripts are then read, coded and analyzed similarly, and the corresponding 
codes are integrated in with those deriving from the documents.  
2. SWO Community Raw Codes 
Here we summarize data and findings for the SWO Community in terms of raw 
codes; that is, we list codes in terms of frequency across our interviewees in Table 2. This 
provides a rough summary of terms mentioned most often during interviews. We list 
roughly 80 such codes in total, but in order to provide focus, only the top 31 (i.e., those 
mentioned five times or more) are presented here. Notice that we include inputs for each 
participant in the table. This facilitates the task when we wish to refer back to a specific 
participant’s interview transcript in order to gain more context regarding a certain term, 
something we do extensively in second order analysis. 
Note that this table excludes codes and frequencies derived from the written 
documents (i.e., background questionnaire and common interview questions). Instead, it 
includes only codes applied through interviews. In essence, a layer of filtering and focus 
has taken place already, as our analysis of written responses has primed us for asking 
more specific and informative questions during the interviews and for placing 
participants’ oral stories and responses in context with their backgrounds, issues, 
expectations and intentions. This enables us to concentrate on talent and retention, yet 
remain in the contexts and use the terms of our participants. 
At this point, we’re trying to get an overall sense of the data, looking simply for 
codes that get repeated. For instance, the code Chiefs is recorded 21 times across all of 
the interviews, with detailers appearing 17 times, fun listed 16 times, along with CO/XO 
quality and talent each included on 15 occasions, 14 instances of life at sea, and so forth. 
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These are the terms mentioned most often during our interviews, which suggests that the 
corresponding topics are of greatest interest and concern to the participants.  
 
Table 2. Most Frequent Codes from Interviews 
 
 
We return to analysis and interpretation below, but to summarize succinctly here, 
our SWO participants express considerable concern regarding their relationships and 
interactions with Chiefs (as JOs). As examples: P1704 asserts that “Chiefs can make or 
break a young JO,” insisting that a “good Chief will guide and train a JO,” and talking 
about having a “strong Chief,” which “made the job boring.” In contrast, P1708 recalls, 
“I never had a helpful Chief; they are supposed to train DivOs; I could never find him.” 
Participants also express considerable concern regarding their relationships and 
interactions with detailers (as JOs). As examples: P1702 reflects passionately: “My 
detailer was an idiot.” P1705 expresses outrage with the memory: “the detailer laughed at 
me when I asked for Shore duty at the NPS.” P1707 laments that you “can’t trust 
detailers.” 
Code P1701 P1702 P1703 P1704 P1705 P1706 P1707 P1708 P1709 P1710 P1711 Total
chiefs 1 4 3 8 3 2 21
detailers 1 3 1 4 6 1 1 17
fun 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 16
CO/XO quality 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 5 15
talent 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 15
life at sea 1 1 1 3 1 1 4 2 14
command 1 1 2 1 1 1 4 1 12
education 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 12
women issues on ships 1 5 1 5 12
family 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 11
do the job 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 10
FITREPs 2 1 3 4 10
NPS 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 10
mil relatives, background 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
good CO 2 1 1 4 8
overseas travel 2 1 1 1 1 2 8
burn out people 1 1 1 1 3 7
DH bonus 1 1 1 1 2 1 7
good for me 1 1 3 1 1 7
money 1 3 1 2 7
SWO Community 2 1 1 1 2 7
camaraderie 1 2 1 1 1 6
CO/SO risks, job security 1 2 3 6
command climate 1 1 2 2 6
hard work 3 1 2 6
sea duty 1 1 1 2 1 6
stress 1 2 1 1 1 6
adaptable 1 1 1 2 5
administrivia, bureaucracy 1 1 1 2 5
driving ships 1 1 1 1 1 5
WTI 1 2 2 5
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Many participants list fun as a driving motivator to work hard and stay in the 
Navy. As examples: P1701 is “planning to stay in the Navy until ceases to be fun.” P1706 
muses that “SWO life is stressful,” but it is “fun to navigate a ship.” They also indicate 
that CO and XO quality have major impacts on their enjoyment and professional 
development. As examples: P1709 remembers as a JO that the “first tour was rough,” 
with a “poor command climate … and CO/XO. I didn’t like it.” Alternatively, P1701 
remembers as a JO having “good and helpful CO/XOs.” 
Participants further offer informed and grounded perspectives regarding what 
constitutes SWO talent. As examples: P1707 suggests talent is the “ability to lead and 
perform one’s job,” but explains that it varies across “two kinds of jobs. 1) 
Watchstanding: need quick reactions and reflexes, but need to also work within confines, 
to take timely and accurate actions; can’t just stand there like a deer in the headlights. 2) 
Job billet: ask questions; learn what you need to know to do your job.” P1708 agrees: “1) 
Watchstanding: driving and fighting the ship; experience and intuition; some people 
suck; one guy could drive only during daytime, because CO didn’t trust him; I drove at 
night: Ironic ‘reward’ for higher competency; sometimes the people get punished for 
being good. 2) DivO: keep up with paperwork; day to day work does not involve 
inspirational leadership.” 
Our SWOs have much to say—both positive and negative—about life at sea as 
well. As examples: P1701 includes as something likable about being a SWO, “enjoy sea 
duty.” P1703 adds that “sea time is difficult but OK.” P1704 explains that it “can be 
challenging in general being at sea.” P1707 “didn’t mind sea duty,” but P1705 laments 
being “at sea and won’t be home.” 
Having conducted many qualitative studies along these lines, we are struck by the 
relatively large number of codes appearing frequently. For instance, we notice that ten 
codes (i.e., Chiefs through family in the table) appear 11 or more times (i.e., once per 
participant on average), with an additional 20 codes (i.e., do the job through WTI in the 
table) appearing five or more times (i.e., roughly once per every other participant on 
average). This supports our earlier comment regarding homogeneity of the participants: 
Many of them make the same or similar comments, comments which become codes 
representing potentially important and insightful aspects of the SWO profession and 
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talent. In other words, many of the same thoughts and concerns are on the minds of most 
participants. 
For instance, command is mentioned as an explicit career goal a dozen times. 
Apparently commanding a warship represents a powerful draw for these participants. As 
examples: P1705 notes, “[I’m not interested in] alternate paths to command other than on 
a ship. I want a ship.” P1707 adds a “fear of being disadvantaged in front of command 
boards.” As another instance, education is noted just as frequently as an important career 
step. All of these participants have elected—and been selected for—graduate education at 
the NPS, so this is no surprise. As examples: P1702 advises, “… if you can get training or 
schooling, then take it.” P1708 indicates that “free education” is a motivator to join and 
stay in the Navy. 
As a third instance, women issues on ships is also noted equally often. It seems as 
though a gender mix aboard ship causes some issues—for men and women alike. As 
examples: P1702 states that “berthing on ships with women is a problem.” P1704 adds, 
“men and women working and living together is a challenge … exacerbated aboard ship.” 
Further, we see family codes nearly as frequently. A SWO’s willingness to invest in and 
sustain the hardship associated with long sea tours may depend upon each officer’s 
individual family circumstances. As examples: P1702 emphasizes the “high optempo,” 
explaining that it leaves “no time for family.” P1705 remarks that “being away from 
family” is a major dissatisfier. P1709 adds that “Navy lifestyle is not conducive to 
family.” 
Table 3 provides a complementary summary. Instead of ranking the codes by 
frequency (i.e., how many times each is mentioned by participants), here we tally how 
many different participants mention each code. In Table 2 above, for instance, the code 
Chiefs is noted 21 times throughout the interviews, with some participants (esp. P1704 
and P1709) noting this same code multiple times. In Table 3 below, however, we see that 
only six of the 11 participants note the code, whereas all 11 discuss talent, which is listed 
at the top. 
Clearly there is considerable overlap between these complementary views. For 
instance, talent, fun, CO/XO quality, education, life at sea, command, detailers, family, 
and do the job are included within the top ten codes in both views. However, this latter 
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view through Table 3 shows NPS and mil relatives, background in the top ten instead. 
These participants appear to feel that attending the NPS is positive. As examples: P1702 
says “NPS is the next step,” and P1703 summarizes how a “prior Captain mentor was 
pushing me to get a masters degree at this stage of my career,” adding that such degree is 
“required to make O6.” Even though “more sea time is better overall,” this participant 
notes how getting a “masters degree is good motivator to stay in.” P1705 agrees, saying 
NPS is “atypical of SWOs,” but “would have resigned if not detailed to NPS.” 
 
Table 3. Most Popular Codes from Interviews 
 
 
Regarding military relatives and backgrounds, nine of our 11 participants were 
attracted to the Military because of close family members (esp. parents) and backgrounds 
in military communities (e.g., Seattle, San Diego). Hence current and former career 
military service men and women appear to represent powerful recruiters in terms of their 
children.  
 
C. SECOND ORDER ANALYSIS 
In this section we summarize the second order analysis of our qualitative data. In 
the secondary stage, we treat first order codes and interpretations as “data” for second 
order analysis, clustering such codes into coherent and meaningful categories. This 
Code P1701 P1702 P1703 P1704 P1705 P1706 P1707 P1708 P1709 P1710 P1711 Number
talent 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 11
fun 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 9
CO/XO quality 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 5 9
education 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 9
NPS 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 9
mil relatives, background 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
life at sea 1 1 1 3 1 1 4 2 8
command 1 1 2 1 1 1 4 1 8
detailers 1 3 1 4 6 1 1 7
family 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 7
do the job 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 7
chiefs 1 4 3 8 3 2 6
overseas travel 2 1 1 1 1 2 6
DH bonus 1 1 1 1 2 1 6
burn out people 1 1 1 1 3 5
good for me 1 1 3 1 1 5
SWO Community 2 1 1 1 2 5
camaraderie 1 2 1 1 1 5
sea duty 1 1 1 2 1 5
stress 1 2 1 1 1 5
driving ships 1 1 1 1 1 5
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second order analysis augments its first order counterpart with theoretical insight and 
comparison, bringing in the investigator’s perspective that is informed by the literature. 
Because we are listening actively during our interviews with participants, their 
various statements and the corresponding codes do not occur in isolation. Rather, they 
cluster according to points being made, emotions being expressed, concerns being raised, 
expectations being articulated, and so forth. Reading iteratively and repeatedly through 
the interview transcripts and notes, and looking back through the codes summarized 
above, we group the participants’ coded comments into sets cohering logically together. 
Indeed, using this analytic technique, the roughly 80 codes noted above can be grouped 
into nine clusters: 1) motivation to join, 2) JO jobs, 3) JO experience, 4) life at sea, 5) 
career, 6) motivators, 7) dissatisfiers, 8) SWO Community, and 9) talent. We address 
each in turn. 
1. Motivation to Join  
Those codes comprising the first cluster motivation to join center on military 
relatives and backgrounds. As noted above, nine of our 11 participants were attracted to 
the Military because of close family members (esp. parents) and backgrounds in military 
communities (e.g., Seattle, San Diego). Hence current and former career military service 
men and women appear to represent powerful recruiters in terms of their children. 
2. JO Jobs  
Those codes comprising the second cluster JO jobs summarize some of the 
various jobs performed by participants during their JO tours. To begin quite atypically, 
two participants had Department Head (DH) or equivalent jobs as JOs. One became a DH 
while underway at sea when the more senior officer serving in that role was transferred 
off the ship. Another was assigned as Company Officer of a Coastal Riverines unit on 
deployment conducting mostly convoy missions. Additionally, a couple of participants 
served as Flag Aides during JO tours, and several others qualified for Engineering Officer 
of the Watch. Nearly all participants qualified as both Officer of the Deck and Tactical 
Action Officer, and all of our JOs served in at least one Division Officer (DivO) 
assignment. 
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3. JO Experience  
Those codes comprising the third cluster JO experience are presented in Table 4. 
These represent codes pertaining to participants’ experiences as JOs aboard ship. Notice 
that interaction with Chiefs represents the most cited experience expressed by our 
participants. For the JO aboard ship as a DivO, one’s relationship and interaction with the 
division Chief appear to be very important and influential. More than half of participants 
make note of such relationship and interaction, and one participant (P1709) appears to 
give it great attention. Speaking generally, Chiefs have considerably greater experience—
and are generally older—than the JOs who supervise them, and JOs must rely upon 
Chiefs extensively (esp. in terms of the work that must be done in the division). A 
positive relationship and interaction can be a plus in the JO’s experience, with the 
opposite effect of a negative relationship and interaction. 
 
Table 4. JO Experience Code Cluster 
 
 
More specifically, in addition to the comments noted and quoted above, P1709 
says further: “Chief’s Mess is hit or miss. … Some Chiefs are lazy and not held 
accountable. … A JO has limited authority as DivO. … One DivO who fired a Chief was 
reprimanded by the CO. … Chiefs are untouchable (by regulation). The DivO must carry 
the entire weight of the Division.” When pressed to elaborate, this officer continues: 
“There’s a big issue with Chiefs. … Who gets promoted and how soon they promote … 
some with only 8 years. … The quality of Chiefs is going down. … I know Senior Chiefs. 
They saw it. … People preach like Chiefs are the backbone of the Navy, but they just sit 
in the Chiefs’ Mess drinking coffee.”  
P1710 concurs in some respects, describing the “drama of the Chiefs Mess: The 
Chief just disappeared,” and stating that “some Chiefs despised JOs.” However, this 
Code P1701 P1702 P1703 P1704 P1705 P1706 P1707 P1708 P1709 P1710 P1711 Total
chiefs 1 4 3 8 3 2 21
detailers 1 3 1 4 6 1 1 17
CO/XO quality 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 5 15
good CO 2 1 1 4 8
CO/XO risks, job security 1 2 3 6
command climate 1 1 2 2 6
JO experience 1 1 2
recruiter 1 1
CO attention 1 1
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participant has positive comments regarding the Chief associated with the first sea tour: 
“I had the same Chief through the whole first tour. … He knew his stuff. … I learned a 
lot from him. … He understood junior enlisted well … great overall.” This participant 
adds that “humility goes a long way: They respond well.” 
Apparently the working relationship between DivOs and Chiefs is inconsistent, 
however, even for the same JO across different divisions, departments and ships. P1711, 
for instance, describes a “frustrating period … with a bad CO, Department Head and 
Chief.” However, an “awesome Senior Chief came later, near the end of the tour, who ran 
the department well.” Then on another DivO tour this officer characterizes a different 
Senior Chief as “the best ever.” 
Similarly with Detailers: Interaction with detailers represents the second most 
cited experience expressed by our participants. For the JO (and beyond), one’s 
relationship and interaction with the Detailers appear to be very important and influential 
also. More than half of participants make note of such relationship and interaction, and 
one participant (P1709) appears to give it great attention. Speaking generally, Detailers 
have huge influence over which jobs a JO is able to choose, hence each officer’s Navy 
exposure and experience appear to depend greatly upon the detailers who assign them to 
jobs. A positive relationship and interaction can be a plus in the JO’s experience, with the 
opposite effect of a negative relationship and interaction. 
Most comments pertaining to interactions with Detailers are negative. In addition 
to the comments noted and quoted above, P1703 says that “the detailer lost my 
application for Flag Aide.” P1707 laments how his or her “year group is behind the 
curve. … There’s no opportunity for me to attend WTI schools. … I fear being 
disadvantaged in front of command boards. … The detailers tell me not to worry. … I 
don’t know if I believe you.” P1709 adds how a specific shore job arose through “an 
administrative error of the detailer,” even though it turned out to be “a cool job though … 
I was lucky to get it.” This participant elaborates when pressed regarding detailing in 
general: “Detailing needs improvement … the JO detailers especially. We need more of 
them. … There’s very limited engagement with detailers. … There’s not enough 
information about available jobs. … Detailers make administrative mistakes. … They do 
care but are overworked.”  
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P1710 adds that a Detailer assigned “the 21st job out 20 choices.” P1711 explains 
how “the detailer almost messed up the NPS opportunity: She didn’t keep up with what I 
should be doing … didn’t reply to email. I spent too much time calling. … There was 
only a short time to apply to NPS. … I got the NPS quota, but two months later she says I 
don’t have a slot.” Apparently the working relationship between JOs and Detailers is 
inconsistent, however, even for the same officer across different job assignments. P1711 
adds how “the next detailer was helpful,” for instance. 
As with Detailers, Navy recruiters appear to affect the JO experience too. P1701, 
referring to how the SWO profession was explained initially, notes simply: “It’s a 
running joke: the recruiter lied.” Alternatively, P1705 explains that a recruiter “happened 
to call” and that such telephone call led to joining the Navy. Likewise, P1706 articulates 
how a Navy recruiter on campus influenced the decision to join. 
The next row in Table 4 lists code counts for CO/XO quality: Interaction with 
COs and XOs represents the third most cited experience expressed by our participants. 
For the JO (and beyond), one’s relationship and interaction with the COs and XOs appear 
to be very important and influential as well. Nearly all participants make note of such 
relationship and interaction, and one participant (P1711) appears to give it great attention. 
Speaking generally, COs and XOs have tremendous influence over most aspects of work 
and life aboard ship, hence each JO’s CO/XO exposure and experience appear to affect 
their initial perceptions of Navy life greatly. As with the other aspects discussed above, a 
positive relationship and interaction can be a plus in the JO’s experience, with the 
opposite effect of a negative relationship and interaction. 
Comments pertaining to interactions with COs and XOs are both positive and 
negative. In addition to the comments noted and quoted above, P1701 apparently 
encountered both during a JO tour: “I had a good CO, who followed a bad CO. … I was 
inspired to stay in [the Navy] by the good one.” Elaborating when probed further on this 
topic, the participant adds: “CO quality is important. One CO had a bad leadership style; 
emotionally detached; arms length interactions; a downer for a fresh, energetic USNA 
JO. The new CO had more personality; Department Head was also helpful as a role 
model. … It’s like the Ghost of Christmas Future: Want to see positive leaders as a vision 
of one’s future self.”  
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This officer goes further to clarify, elaborating how his or her perception has 
shifted with experience:  
On further reflection, I realize that the way in which I characterized one of my previous 
CO’s leadership style was perhaps a bit harsh. It wasn’t that it was a bad leadership style. 
It was one which I didn’t quite understand from my perspective as a JO. My dislike of it 
was more a function of my immaturity at the time than it was of his actual performance. 
Later, a different CO had shown me an example I felt more inspired to follow, but it was 
simply a style which resonated with me at the time. As I’ve been in longer, I’ve come to 
appreciate the more detached leadership style of some COs. It doesn’t necessarily make 
him or her a bad leader. In fact, from what I’ve seen there can be less animosity, because 
some can perceive an “emotionally engaged” CO as showing favoritism or developing a 
clique. Keeping everyone at arms length is more even-handed sometimes than being too 
much like “just another member of the wardroom,” if only because it’s hard to apply 
attention equally to everyone. And, wherever there’s a significantly uneven distribution 
of the CO’s personal attention, animosity and jealously are sure to follow.  In short, it’s a 
distinction that I didn’t fully understand until my second tour as a division officer. 
P1705 adds that the “chain of command makes a difference in how you like the 
Navy. … Both the CO and XO on my first ship … helped me see and learn.” P1711 
echoes how a particular CO eased the transition into the SWO Community, 
characterizing three different COs as “two good, one bad.” 
This participant also notes how much power the CO has aboard ship: “Instructions 
are followed at the leisure of the CO. If the CO wants something done that goes against a 
procedure, then you better listen. If you mess up following a procedure, you better hope 
all you get is a good yelling at.” Elaborating further through probing, this officer appears 
to imply a SWO cultural dimension that induces stress: “The CRU-DES community self 
imposes stress. … CG COs are less jerks. They made O6 already. … The DDG COs are 
often jerks. … The CO is afraid of making mistakes. Everyone’s scared of getting fired. 
The Department Head wants to please the CO in every way, and hence is afraid to speak 
up.” This speaks further to job security and command climate, both of which affect the 
JO experience, and which are listed in the table too.  
4. Life at Sea  
Those codes comprising the fourth cluster life at sea are presented in Table 5. 
These represent codes pertaining to participants’ comments regarding life aboard ship. 
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Life at sea is a central part of the SWO profession, and every participant has something to 
say about it. 
 
Table 5. Life at Sea Code Cluster 
 
  
 P1701, for instance, “enjoys sea duty.” P1703 stresses how “more sea time is 
better (professionally) overall,” and adds that “sea time is difficult but okay.” P1704 
continues: “It can be challenging in general being at sea.” P1706 agrees, describing how 
“SWO life is stressful,” but this participant also notes that it’s “fun to navigate a ship” 
and describes how the “sea takes me away from stresses.” P1707 “didn’t mind sea duty,” 
but says that “it gets boring after quals.” All said, “the positive points outweigh the 
negatives.” P1708 adds that “life at sea is not hard.” 
Not everyone agrees, however. One officer, for instance, states succinctly: 
“Working aboard ship sucks.” This seems to be the case particularly for those with or 
contemplating families. One parent participant, for instance, muses that his young 
children “need their dad. … [but] I’m at sea and won’t be home. The optempo is too high. 
The Navy says it cares, but it doesn’t.” Nonetheless, this officer admits, “I knew what it 
meant to be a SWO.” One female participant adds: “The Navy lifestyle is not conducive 
to family. … Being pregnant while on sea duty hurts. … The Navy tells you when to 
have a family.” A male participant elaborates: “I’m single with no kids. Because of the 
high optempo, there’s no time for family. … I would have gotten out if I had a family. … 
Each person has priorities.” Another participant adds: “I have no kids or dogs, but that 
would be hard [to accommodate with sea duty].” 
Several participants raise the issue of women aboard ships. One female 
participant, for instance, explains: “It's a man's world for the most part at sea,” 
elaborating, “some Captains tend to favor the men or be more willing to be mentor them 
at different level.” Another female participant adds how “men and women working and 
Code P1701 P1702 P1703 P1704 P1705 P1706 P1707 P1708 P1709 P1710 P1711 Total
life at sea 1 1 1 3 1 1 4 2 14
sea duty 1 1 1 2 1 6
women issues on ships 1 5 1 5 12
burn out people 1 1 1 1 3 7
stress 1 2 1 1 1 6
not enough people 1 2 1 4
life at sea not hard 1 1
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living together is a challenge, which gets exacerbated aboard ship.” Nonetheless, she’s 
“tired of talking about it; all of the ‘period’ jokes; people thinking they’re better without 
saying (or proving) it; offensive on a personal level.”  
Still another participant states simply: “There’s not much the Navy can do for 
women.” When pressed to elaborate, we learn, however, that “women SWOs are not a 
systematic issue.” Continuing, we discover how “some women Senior Officers were hard 
asses and mean … a sign of when they started. It was harder then. … There are no 
systematic problems, just isolated incidents.” She summarizes: “While there is some 
appearance of preferential treatment, there’s no overt discrimination. The Navy is good at 
eliminating personal bias on promotion boards.” When elaborating on working 
relationships with men versus women at sea, this officer continues, “everyone [male and 
female] is equally irritating.” 
A male participant describes particular issues with berthing, however: “Berthing 
on ships with women is a problem. … I was stuck in (small) overflow berthing for two 
deployments, the “JO Jungle.” A female participant describes the opposite perspective: 
“Women get staterooms. Men live in the JO Jungle. It was okay for me (as woman).”  
 Several people note the workload and culture aboard ship. P1702, for instance, 
summarizes a distaste for how ship crews will “train until you break people and 
equipment,” adding, “our own system causes problems. … Sometimes it’s essential to 
burn someone out to accomplish a mission, but it’s bad to burn people out just as habit.” 
This officer describes further how there are “not enough people to do all of the necessary 
jobs well.” P1706 characterizes it as “always doing more with less” and describes “a 
manpower shortage.”  
P1703 explains how SWO culture at sea “leads to pushing people harder.” P1705 
adds, “I work very hard” and notes the “ridiculous hours we work.” P1704 describes how 
work aboard ship “can wear you down. … It can be hard to accept criticism, especially if 
you take it personally.” P1709 describes further the “high stress level and ship life with 
no sleep. … The days just blur together. It’s exhausting and leads to bad decision making. 
There’s a lot that can go wrong. It’s not that a person is an idiot; just hasn’t slept in a day. 
… Too much work is a cultural issue. Sleep is almost discouraged. It’s a pride thing. You 
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get brownie points for working all day. There’s a lot of brown nosing. If the CO is on the 
ship, people will stay on too. … There’s too much to do in a day.”  
5. Career  
Those codes comprising the fifth cluster career are presented in Table 6. These 
represent codes pertaining to participants’ comments regarding pursuing careers as 
SWOs. Foremost on SWO minds in this regard is command, and nearly every participant 
has something to say about it.  
 
Table 6. Career Code Cluster 
 
  
P1701, for instance, says that “CO is an important opportunity. You learn to lead 
at the pinnacle. Some unprepared COs lack the temperament. They look good on paper 
but need practice being a small CO before becoming a big one. One could command an 
LCS or other, smaller ship as a trial.” P1703 seconds the idea of more opportunities for 
early command, saying they “would be strong incentives” for talented people to stay in 
the Navy. The officer also bemoans an apparent relative shortage of command billets, 
eager for additional career opportunities as CO. P1705 also agrees with the importance of 
early command, adding that the incentive system may be misaligned: “Is early command 
somehow inferior to playing a lesser role on a DDG? This seems stupid.” This officer is 
very focused on career and command: “I know my path. … DDG OpsO. I need to get 
what I want. … I want a ship. This is Chess, not Checkers. Need to look far ahead.”  
For this self-admitted high performer, who has worked very hard and done very 
well professionally, continued career success appears vital for retention: “I promise that I 
will excel. I’ve done all that I can do, but I may not get what I need. Why must I jump 
through hoops? My track record should speak for itself. I’ll do great and wonderful 
things. I’ve done a wonderful job.” This officer elaborates on the need for sacrifice and 
Code P1701 P1702 P1703 P1704 P1705 P1706 P1707 P1708 P1709 P1710 P1711 Total
command 1 1 2 1 1 1 4 1 12
early command 1 2 3
more command opportunities 1 1 2
FITREPs 2 1 3 4 10
career path limited 2 2
good for me 1 1 3 1 1 7
how far I can go 1 1 2
see if I can handle it 1 1
WTI 1 2 2 5
chance, destiny 1 1 2
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endurance: “At some point it will be time for me to say good-bye. They can’t tell me ‘no’ 
after such sacrifice. They don’t help us to get there. It’s getting better … impacting for 
better. I hope others don’t endure what I have.” P1709 expresses a similar thought: 
“Becoming the CO of a ship seems cool. I put in a lot of effort. I want to get as much as I 
can out of it.” 
To attain command, one must earn or receive good fitness reports and fare well 
through promotion boards, both of which are a concern to most participants. P1701, for 
instance, appears to be doing well in the current system: “fitreps are important. The 
CO/XO must be good at writing them. … It’s OK for me. I’ve had good and helpful 
CO/XOs.” This officer adds, “if the fitrep system changes to disfavor me and my 
performance,” then such change might impact the next decision to stay in the Navy. 
Other participants (e.g., P1702, P1705, P1708, P1709) also note that the current system 
appears to be working well for them.  
Alternatively, P1710 notes that the career path appears to be limited, and P1707 
reports that many “fitreps are not merit based. … I had a three month eval … and was 
ranked at the bottom. Other people [with more time in the command] got the best evals. 
… The CO/XO said, ‘you’re still fodder’ [for others’ evaluations].” As noted above, this 
officer continues: “I fear being disadvantaged in front of command boards [due to 
detailer and career timing issues].” P1709 explains that timing is very important in what 
is described as a rigid promotion board process: “The promotion board process could be 
more flexible. The rules for O4 are very rigid: DH school by year 7; ship by year 8; 
competitive fitrep on sea duty. This scares people. There’s no flexibility.” 
Hence, whereas most participants are highly focused on their careers, with 
command as a central objective, many appear to be realistic regarding opportunities even 
for “talented” officers like themselves. P1704, for instance, describes wanting to “see if I 
can handle it,” and both P1706 and P1709 talk about “seeing how far” they can go in the 
system. Moreover, SWO talent and interest need not necessarily be limited to command 
at sea. In the context of alternate career tracks, for instance, P1706 argues: “Command at 
sea is not the only career path. Let people go where they’re most talented … appealing to 
what they’re interested in.” P1711, as another instance, is “not interested in being CO,” 
elaborating that the “CO is just a care taker.”  
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6. Motivators  
Those codes comprising the sixth cluster motivators are presented in Table 7. By 
far, the greatest motivator appears to be the “fun” associated with the SWO life and 
profession. As summarized in the table, nine of our 11 participants use this word to 
describe in part what motivates them to stay in the Navy. P1701, for instance, remarks: 
“I’m planning to stay in the Navy until it ceases to be fun,” adding, “10% fun time makes 
the other 90% tolerable.” As noted above, for another instance, P1706 muses that 
although “SWO life is stressful,” it is “fun to navigate a ship.”  
 
Table 7. Motivator Code Cluster 
 
  
Overseas travel and adventure are mentioned frequently as motivators also, as is 
the money earned as a SWO professional. Indeed, most participants mention the DH 
bonus specifically as a motivator to stay in—even though many express dissatisfaction 
with missing the recent increase in the bonus amount due to their year group and 
timing—and both professional stability and security are noted as well. Somewhat 
surprisingly for a SWO, P1705 describes being marketable outside the military, but many 
participants mention camaraderie and being part of the Navy family as strong motivators 
too. 
Leadership—in terms of being led by superiors—emerges as a factor that can 
motivate as well as dissatisfy. As reported above, for instance, P1701 characterizes both 
sides of leadership: One CO had a bad leadership style. … a downer for a fresh, energetic 
USNA JO. The new CO had more personality; Department Head was also helpful as a 
Code P1701 P1702 P1703 P1704 P1705 P1706 P1707 P1708 P1709 P1710 P1711 Total
fun 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 16
overseas travel 2 1 1 1 1 2 8
money 1 3 1 2 7
DH bonus 1 1 1 1 2 1 7
camaraderie 1 2 1 1 1 6
helping sailors 1 1 1 1 4
stability/security 1 2 3
leadership 1 1 1 3
service 1 1 1 3
leading sailors 1 1 2
challenging 2 2
important 1 1 2
teach 1 1 2
marketable 1 1
help JOs 1 1
adventure 1 1
Navy family 1 1
real job to do 1 1
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role model. It’s like the Ghost of Christmas Future: Want to see positive leaders as vision 
of one’s future self.” P1706 adds: “I haven’t thought about leaving; maybe if the culture 
of leadership runs astray.” Complementarily, leadership—in terms of leading others—
emerges as a motivator only. Four participants mention helping sailors as a motivator, 
with service of an important organization, teaching and leading sailors mentioned 
positively also. 
Finally, regarding a “real job” to perform, P1702 notes this as a motivator, but 
other participants characterize some of their JO jobs using terms such as “not a real 
position” (P1711), “not a real job,” “made up job,” “fake job” (P1708) and like monikers. 
One participant (P1701) elaborates on the phenomenon:  
The made-up job is an unfortunate consequence of the current manning. We're over-
manned with junior officers, so there are more SWOs-in-training than there are jobs. The 
XO then has to flex some creative muscle to find work for them. Additionally, there's 
only one bridge on any ship, so the demand signal for officer training increases on every 
ship, without an increase in capacity. 
 
Such participants appear to bemoan the (too) large number of JOs aboard some 
ships. In contrast, however, many other participants (e.g., P1702, P1705, P1709) 
complain about having a shortage of officers and too much work to do.  
7. Dissatisfiers  
Those codes comprising the seventh cluster dissatisfiers are presented in Table 8. 
This summary makes it very clear that “family” represents the greatest source of 
dissatisfaction. We’ve included some related notes and quotes in various clusters such as 
sea life above, but we concentrate them here for emphasis. To begin, some participants 
are apparently single with no children. As noted above, for two instances, a male 
participant elaborates: “I’m single with no kids. Because of the high optempo, there’s no 
time for family. … I would have gotten out if I had a family. … Each person has 
priorities.” Another participant adds: “I have no kids or dogs, but that would be hard [to 
accommodate with sea duty].” Another male officer states simply, “I’m OK with the 
current system. I’m a single guy.”  
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Table 8. Dissatisfier Code Cluster 
 
  
Other participants have families and appear to regret spending time away at sea. 
As noted above, for instance, one parent participant muses that his young children “need 
their dad. … [but] I’m at sea and won’t be home. The optempo is too high. The Navy 
says it cares, but it doesn’t.” Nonetheless, this officer admits, “I knew what it meant to be 
a SWO.” One female participant adds: “The Navy lifestyle is not conducive to family. … 
Being pregnant while on sea duty hurts. … The Navy tells you when to have a family.” 
Alternatively, one participant is weaving family into the SWO career by attending the 
NPS, saying, “we wanted to have a child [here in Monterey].” 
The other code conveying considerable dissatisfaction centers on bureaucracy. 
P1701, for instance, offers several problems stemming from “a peacetime Navy: 
administrivia; seeming like being ready; focus on inspection instead of being truly ready; 
like when a teenager cleans his room only when mom and dad come to inspect; 
overreadiness to accept all ideas, regardless of merit … making the DoD more 
businesslike detracts from military organization.” P1711 echoes a similar dissatisfying 
sentiment: “Peacetime: administrative, secretarial jobs; need to shoot every weapon every 
week; but can’t necessarily get ammo, time and space to shoot; Navy is losing its warrior 
mentality; freezing up when shot at; drudgery: prepare for next inspection; pass; get 
ready; etc; so much administration: not war fighting.”  
Moreover, both P1705 and P1707 use the word “bureaucracy” to denote a specific 
dislike with the Navy. P1708 agrees, adding: “I’m fairly satisfied, but bureaucracy is 
frustrating … asinine tasks.” This officer elaborates with a short sea story: “Our ship was 
anchored, and the CO was being yelled at by some random guy on a power trip regarding 
an in-port report. We had no template. The report was not required. He rejected our first 
draft, because there was a section on how to do vehicle inspections. We were at sea!”  
Code P1701 P1702 P1703 P1704 P1705 P1706 P1707 P1708 P1709 P1710 P1711 Total
family 1 1 1 2 1 4 1 11
administrivia, bureaucracy 1 1 1 2 5
not a real job 2 1 3
peacetime 1 1 1 3
warrior 1 1 2
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8. SWO Community  
Those codes comprising the penultimate cluster SWO Community are presented in 
Table 9. These codes pertain to participants’ comments regarding the SWO profession, 
about which several officers offer a number of observations, thoughts and perceptions. 
P1704, for instance, notes: “The SWO Community is extremely challenging and 
rewarding. You must gain the trust of your command. You can’t find this kind of 
experience outside SWO Community. It can wear you down, however.” This officer adds 
that the recently enacted career track changes make the SWO Community “more 
attractive.” P1706 offers some similar comments, characterizing “a community of 
SWOs,” emphasizing that “we’re all together,” and appreciating the “camaraderie.” This 
officer also notes the SWO “culture and brotherhood bonds” as attractive aspects of the 
professional community. 
 
Table 9. SWO Community Code Cluster 
 
  
Speaking less positively, P1708 describes “fallen angels,” which represent 
“failures from other communities,” and “people wanting to lateral into other 
communities,” saying, “they’re not committed.” When asked to elaborate, a short story 
follows about an O1 fallen angel: “The CO couldn’t trust him. He was not recommended 
for retention, but it took 18 months to ‘fire’ him. He was collecting a paycheck for doing 
nothing. It takes a long time and much documentation to get rid of someone. I wonder 
whether COs fear that nonretention will reflect poorly on them.” When noting dislikes 
and dissatisfiers, this officer continues, “too many ‘toxic ensigns’ are permitted to 
continue.” P1710 has similar observations: “There’s not a lot of SWO pride. … It’s 
almost like a dumping ground for officers. … There’s a stigma. … We should be more 
like aviation. We should be getting better.”  
Through further follow up, P1708 adds:  
 
There are many officers which are useless on a ship but they take multiple years to get 
separated from the ship and then the Navy. Often times, these useless officers, when they 
Code P1701 P1702 P1703 P1704 P1705 P1706 P1707 P1708 P1709 P1710 P1711 Total
SWO Community 2 1 1 1 2 7
SWO not first choice 1 1 2
failures, laterals 1 2 3
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finally do leave the ship, get to spend the rest of their time on shore duty (i.e. 6 months to 
one year) while they ever so slowly get processed out. This creates a lot of frustration 
with the other officers that are working hard and doing their sea time when they see lazy 
people get rewarded essentially. The SWO Community also gets all of the rejects from 
other communities (failed pilots, failed submariners, etc...) who have a chip on their 
shoulder and consequently don't bother to work hard because they are just waiting to get 
out. Similarly, we have a lot of officers from other communities (INTEL, SIGNAL 
WARFARE) that only come on a ship for one division tour so they can get "sea 
experience" and similarly don't really care how they perform because they are only on a 
ship temporarily. This makes for a pretty sad wardroom.” 
 
Given the relatively recent, fatal accidents involving ships at sea, P1709 provides 
some timely insight: “SWO Senior Officers are vulnerable as they progress. They get 
fired if anything goes wrong. LCS COs were fired for engineering problems. There’s low 
job security.” As noted and quoted above, this officer continues with insight regarding 
SWO culture: “The days just blur together. It’s exhausting and leads to bad decision 
making. There’s a lot that can go wrong. It’s not that a person is an idiot; just hasn’t slept 
in a day. … Too much work is a cultural issue. Sleep is almost discouraged. It’s a pride 
thing. You get brownie points for working all day.”  
This participant also adds insight into JO life at sea as a Division Officer: 
“There’s too much to do in a day. … You have to do everything yourself. We’re not 
taught to delegate. … There’s not a standard division in the Navy anymore. … The 
Chief’s Mess is hit or miss. Some Chiefs are lazy. They’re not held accountable. You 
have limited authority as DivO. … One DivO who fired a Chief was reprimanded by the 
CO. … Chiefs are untouchable (by regulation): The DivO must carry the entire weight of 
the Division.” 
9. Talent  
Those codes comprising the final cluster talent are presented in Table 10. These 
represent codes pertaining to participants’ comments regarding SWO talent. Most of the 
codes listed beneath “talent” in the table represent attributes or characteristics of SWO 
talent. Notice that every participant has something to say about talent directly. P1701, for 
instance, characterizes SWO talent in terms of: “desire; assume responsibility; humility; 
want to learn; ask questions. … Politics becomes important at some managerial level: 
Navigate politics, but don’t take it too seriously and become cynical.” Here we note some 
motivational aspects of talent (e.g., desire, want to learn, ask questions), and we learn that 
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some attributes of talent (e.g., politics) appear to shift as one increases rank in the 
organization. 
 
Table 10. Talent Code Cluster 
 
 
P1704 expands, saying that it’s important to “break out more talented and 
passionate people: Easier to retain them.” Regarding talent, this participant includes the 
four elements “dynamic, adaptable, innovative, and good time management.” P1705 
expands further and tells a story about a talented officer that left the Navy: “[Talented] 
people have a spark, a fire about them; unique; take on a problem and produce a solution; 
10 degrees right or left of center; pool solutions with others; they care; people care about 
the job and other people; work hard.” This participant continues with a story about a 
talented junior officer: “A gal [name] was a second tour SWO: She came from a really 
good school, with a degree in Engineering. She had ‘early command’ in the 
recommendation block on her fitrep. But then she moved from a DDG to a carrier. She 
got tired of SWO life … the ridiculous hours we work … and submitted a lateral transfer 
package for HR. She knew someone in PERS. … However, a SWO Captain on the 
selection board says, ‘You can’t have her.’ She had talent. She left the Navy, embittered.” 
P1702 discusses talent in terms of flexibility and adaptability: “general skills; get 
put into any job and then adapt; adaptability is important; tackle out of the box activities; 
selected to do unusual jobs.” P1703 expands the view by emphasizing the importance of 
Code P1701 P1702 P1703 P1704 P1705 P1706 P1707 P1708 P1709 P1710 P1711 Total
talent 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 15
education 1 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 12
NPS 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 10
do the job 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 10
hard work 3 1 2 6
adaptable 1 1 1 2 5
driving ships 1 1 1 1 1 5
management skills 1 2 1 4
learning 1 1 1 3
care about the job 1 1 2
personality 2 2
responsibility 1 1 2
sacrifice 1 1 2
watchstanding 1 1 2
cooperate 1 1
desire 1 1
general skills 1 1
innovation 1 1
politics 1 1
read instructions 1 1
technical skills 1 1
unusual jobs 1 1
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learning: “It’s important to read instructions, policies, and manuals; be good at learning; 
fast learners do well. … One LDO was never willing to accept that he was wrong. … 
Trust but verify. … Important to visualize ships and tactics; people standing watch must 
do mental math quickly; the key is to find shortcuts.”  
In addition to “performance,” P1706 also mentions the importance of teamwork in 
terms of talent attributes: “Teach others; LaBron James must play with others; 
management; teaching subordinates and peers; it matters to me and ships. … Work on 
performance and skill sets; strengthen others.” P1711 agrees, offering succinctly: 
“Working with people and getting the job done.” P1710 focuses on performance too: 
“People accomplish what they need to aboard ship; make a decision; get stuff done; not 
screaming; not yelling; decision making under stress.”  
P1707 agrees with respect to performance, saying that talent centers on one’s 
“ability to lead and perform the job.” This participant then notes that SWO talent differs 
across “two kinds of jobs. 1) Watchstanding: you need quick reactions and reflexes, but 
need to also work within confines, to take timely and accurate actions; can’t just stand 
there like a deer in the headlights. 2) Job billet: ask questions; learn what you need to 
know to do your job.” As noted above, P1708 characterizes SWO talent in terms of two 
areas also. “1) Watchstanding: driving and fighting the ship; experience and intuition; 
some people suck; one guy could drive only during daytime, because the CO didn’t trust 
him; I drove at night: Ironic ‘reward’ for higher competency; sometimes the people get 
punished for being good. 2) DivO: keep up with paperwork; day to day work does not 
involve inspirational leadership.” 
For P1709, talent takes on these characteristics: “Individual experiences; 
performance; I did my job; I’m a good ship driver; ship driving performance meant more 
than DivO.” This participant also mentions rewards (e.g., fitreps) vs. intrinsic abilities: 
“Some people are unwilling to do their jobs; it’s not hard to figure out; not rocket 
science; there’s an answer for everything we do; you can find answers; but not everyone 
seeks them out. … Personality is important too; some officers are not good with people: 
they don’t do so well. … Talent involves figuring out a new job.” Here we see elements 
that share commonality with many of those noted and quoted above (e.g., performance, 
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doing one’s job, ship driving, figuring out a new job), but we also gain insight into how 
personality and interacting well with people is important. 
 
D. SUMMARY DISCUSSION 
In this section we summarize, synthesize and integrate our findings from above. 
We begin by building upon the qualitative data analysis pertaining to talent in the SWO 
Community, for this informs the first part of our research question directly: What 
constitutes talent in the SWO Community? We build then upon analysis pertaining to 
motivators and dissatisfiers, for this informs the second part of our research question: 
Why do some talented people choose to leave the Navy while others choose to stay in? 
We address in turn the third part of our research question: How can we retain 
talent in the Navy? The short answer is to a) identify and reward talented people; and b) 
emphasize motivators and mitigate dissatisfiers. This first part of this answer is more 
challenging than the second, for it remains difficult to identify talented SWOs 
systematically, especially during their first sea tours as JOs. After reviewing a draft of 
this report, our Strategic Contact summarizes: 
My Chief concern is that … you seem to gloss over the true difficulty of 
recognizing talent, both at a unit level and at a Navywide level. As much as the young 
folks don’t want to admit it, for their first 2-4 years, they all kind of “look alike.” To be 
sure, there are a few true superstars whose innate potential is immediately recognizable, 
and there are a few duds who never should have been commissioned in the first place. 
But the great mass of JOs – and I would put myself in this category – take time to learn 
and develop. Some officers bloom a little more quickly, but some later bloomers show 
remarkable performance once “the light switch turns on.” 
 
We revisit this in our set of recommendations to address each significant retention 
risk identified through this analysis, and we incorporate some brief discussion of insights 
with respect to the ongoing performance evaluation transformation process. 
1. Talent 
What constitutes talent in the SWO Community? We find a combination of 
personal attributes and evidence of performance, especially aboard ships at sea. Toward 
the former, for several instances, recall comments from above such as, “desire; assume 
responsibility; humility; want to learn; ask questions” (P1701); “dynamic; adaptable; 
innovative” (P1704); and “people have a spark, a fire about them; unique … they care; 
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people care about the job and other people” (P1705). From this we see that a talented 
SWO appears to be highly motivated, humble, caring and adaptable. 
Confirmingly, we see some of these same attributes noted as important by senior 
Navy leaders. In terms of high motivation, for instance, the CNO writes this regarding 
attributes of Navy leaders (Richardson, 2017, p. 2):  
 
In the US Navy, at this point in our history, we need leaders with this drive. It’s an 
important question to ask yourself: are you driven to pursue the theoretical limits of 
performance? If so, you could be a Navy leader. If you can’t find the relentless drive to 
inspire others and be the best in the world, then leadership in the U.S. Navy is not for 
you. The security of the nation is too important. 
 
In this same document, we find other references to motivation, humility, caring 
and adaptability also: 
 
Effective Navy leaders demonstrate a deliberate commitment to grow throughout their 
careers. They work from a foundation of humility, embracing our core values of honor, 
courage, and commitment. They behave with integrity, accountability, initiative and 
toughness. Navy leaders commit to improving the competence and character of 
themselves and their teams. They inspire their teams to learn so as to achieve their best 
possible performance. In our Navy, leaders can take full advantage of a rich combination 
of formal schools, structured on-the-job training and experience, and self-guided 
education (p. 1). … When they win, [great leaders] are grateful, humble, and spent from 
their effort (p. 2). 
 
First and foremost, Navy leaders must have a burning drive to develop their teams to 
consistently and sustainably deliver maximum performance. Competence and character 
are so tightly intertwined that they must be strengthened together. The Navy has a robust 
program of schools, on-the-job training, and self-guided learning. By executing this 
framework, our Navy will produce leaders and teams who learn and adapt to achieve 
maximum possible performance, and who set and maintain high standards, to be ready 
for decisive operations and combat (p. 8). 
  
Toward the latter, we note some skills such as “good time management” (P1704), 
“pool solutions with others” (P1705), “learning” (P1703), and “flexibility and 
adaptability” (P1702), but (job) “performance” (aboard ships at sea) appears to be the 
central aspect of SWO talent. For several instances, recall comments from above such as, 
“performance and teamwork” (P1706), “working with people and getting the job done” 
(P1711), “people accomplish what they need to aboard ship” (P1710), “lead and perform 
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the job” (P1707), and “I did my job; I’m a good ship driver” (P1709). We learn further 
that SWO JO job performance at sea involves both Watchstander and Division Officer 
roles (P1707 & P1708), which require different skills and reflect different aspects of 
talent. Nonetheless, “ship driving performance meant more than DivO” (P1709), and as 
noted by many participants, “hard work” is very important too.  
Hence a talented SWO is highly motivated, humble, caring and adaptable, and he 
or she is able to work hard, cooperate with others, and do the job aboard ship, living and 
working at sea for extended periods of time.  
Particularly for this sample frame of relatively junior officers (O3), such view of 
talent seems highly appropriate. Early in their careers, professional skills are key 
(Strategic Contact, 2018), and they are judged in large part based on their ability to 
absorb large volumes of professional information. Such ability is rated as highly 
important by Flag Officers as well (Naval War College, 2017), and their ability to learn 
reflects the kind of high velocity learning exhorted by the CNO (Richardson, 2016). 
Returning to the comments made by our Strategic Contact, this emergent 
characterization of talent is somewhat retrospective, however, and it reflects the junior 
perspective of our participants. We say “retrospective,” because it seems difficult to 
identify talent along the lines of this characterization until a JO has worked aboard ship 
for some time. This makes it difficult to identify SWO talent before JOs start working 
aboard ship, hence the challenge of giving the most talented people the best assignments 
persists. We address this in part through our recommendations below.  
As such, being observed and evaluated by ship CO/XOs—who presumably know 
talent when they see and work with it—appears to represent a very appropriate way to 
identify talent, and we would hope to see such identification reflected on FITREPs. As 
noted below, however, such hope may not be fulfilled to the extent necessary, and our 
recommendations address the evaluation process in part below as well. 
Further, because all of our study participants represent talented JOs, it remains 
unclear which if any of them will continue to progress and demonstrate talent at more 
senior ranks. As our Strategic Contact admits and emphasizes above, “Some officers 
bloom a little more quickly, but some later bloomers show remarkable performance once 
‘the light switch turns on.’” 
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2. Motivators and Dissatisfiers 
Why do some talented people choose to leave the Navy while others choose to 
stay in? Since this study focuses on relatively junior officers, most of which are moving 
now toward serving as Department Heads, our inferences pertain principally to JOs, but 
they may apply to more senior SWOs also. As noted above, nearly all of our participants 
are motivated by the “fun” associated with the SWO life and profession. Driving and 
fighting a ship, for instance, is apparently highly motivational for many SWOs. Other 
factors such as overseas travel and adventure, stability, security and money appear to 
motivate also, and we see camaraderie, service and leadership as motivational too, but 
fun appears to dominate this discussion. SWOs appear to be highly motivated by career 
advancement as well, which requires high performance levels over extended periods of 
time. 
Despite such motivators, however, many talented SWOs decide not to stay in the 
Navy. Much of the decision appears to center on the kinds of jobs they get assigned, their 
early experiences aboard ship, and life at sea. Regarding JO jobs, those participants who 
were able to serve in a DH or equivalent capacity report considerable satisfaction with the 
corresponding challenge and opportunity, as do those serving as Flag Aide or otherwise 
able to interact with high level officers. In contrast, those who are not assigned to “real 
jobs” report dissatisfaction. 
As a note, such assignment to “made up jobs” stems from a relative surplus of JOs 
aboard ship. Under the current system (esp. given current retention rates), in order for the 
Navy to have a sufficient number of qualified officers to serve in Department Head 
billets, a comparatively large number of Ensigns must be recruited and assigned to sea 
tours, which means that some ships have more JOs than necessary working aboard them. 
This relative surplus contributes to perceived berthing disparities also: ships are not 
designed with enough staterooms to accommodate all of their current officers. We 
address these issues in our recommendations below, but briefly, if retention rates can be 
increased, then some of these issues will abate on their own. 
In terms of JO experience, interactions with Chiefs can be either a motivator or 
dissatisfier, depending largely upon how well the JO feels supported by each Chief, 
which apparently can vary widely across divisions, departments, ships and commands. 
 46 
Interactions with Detailers can be either a motivator or dissatisfier also, depending 
similarly upon how well the JO feels supported, and which apparently can vary widely 
too. Likewise with CO/XO interaction: this can motivate or dissatisfy as well, depending 
in part upon guidance and mentoring, but centering largely on the command climate. 
Finally, life at sea has some motivational aspects, for this is where the “fun” takes 
place, but sea time aboard ship appears to be a relatively strong dissatisfier. As noted 
above, life at sea is a central part of the SWO profession, and “more sea time is better 
(professionally) overall” (P1703). However, several aspects of such life appear 
problematic, particularly for SWOs with or contemplating families, and it appears that 
many SWOs must choose between career and family, especially the women (due to 
pregnancy). Even for single officers not contemplating families (at this time), we note the 
high stress, long hours and perceived disparity between male and female berthing 
opportunities as driving much dissatisfaction. 
 
Table 11. Significant Retention Risks 
Retention Risk Underlying Issues 
Not assigned to challenging jobs Level of interaction 
Feeling of value to the organization 
Unfavorable interaction with Chiefs Lack of support & training 
Perceived inequality 
Unfavorable interaction with Detailers Lack of support & opportunity 
Mistrust 
Unfavorable CO/XO interaction  Lack of guidance & mentoring 
Inhospitable command climate 
Lack of command opportunities Early command 
Perceived FITREP inequality 
Family planning Rigid career timeline 
Pregnancy 
Dissatisfaction with sea life High stress, long hours & “fallen angels” 
Perceived berthing disparity 
  
To summarize, we identify the seven significant retention risks4 and underlying 
issues listed in Table 11. Briefly, JOs seek assignments to challenging jobs, especially 
those that entail interaction at relatively higher levels (e.g., DH and Flag Aide roles), and 
                                                 
4 In contrast with our prior investigation into the Information Warfare Community (IWC), the allure of 
jobs, salaries and benefits in the civilian sector does not arise as a notable retention risk in the present 
study. This could stem in part from how IWC jobs translate directly to civilian counterparts, both of which 
are in great demand and grossly understaffed. It could stem also from the relative novelty and current 
importance of Cyberspace and corresponding jobs with respect to seamanship. 
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they thrive on feeling that they are providing value to the organization. This is the 
opposite of working “made up jobs.” They also seek Chiefs who are willing to support 
and train them, and they want to see consistency across the diversity of Chiefs assigned to 
them in different divisions, departments, ships and commands. Similar goals and wants 
apply to  Detailers, whom JOs expect to support and provide them with opportunities in 
terms of job assignments, and they look for greater transparency as a step toward 
increasing trust. 
CO/XO interaction is critically important too, as JOs seek guidance and 
mentoring from their senior officers, and whereas these relatively young officers can 
thrive in positive command climates, toxic leadership and inhospitable climates can drive 
even the most talented people away. Careers are very important to JOs, who are willing 
to make big sacrifices in terms of hard work and long hours away from friends and 
families while at sea. However, a perceived lack of command opportunities troubles 
many of our participants—with several even seeking early command—many of whom 
are troubled by perceived FITREP inequalities also.  
Even so, family planning and dissatisfaction with sea life present two, dominant 
retention risks. Many JOs seek greater flexibility in their career timelines—which is 
addressed in part through the multiple career track options that have become available 
recently—but they don’t want to sacrifice their promotion and command opportunities to 
do so, and many JOs wish to start families at some points in their careers. The high stress 
and long hours associated with life at sea can “burn people out.”  
3. Talent Retention 
How can we retain talent in the Navy? The short answer is to a) identify and 
reward talented people; and b) emphasize motivators and mitigate dissatisfiers. Far from 
a glib response, we offer this sincerely and as a direct outcome of the preceding 
discussion. Through this study, we understand better now what constitutes talent in the 
SWO Community. In some sense, this should enable us to identify talented SWO officers 
more easily, and hence to assess the relative retention risks associated with these talented 
people. 
However, as noted above, identifying talent remains a challenge, particularly 
prospectively for JOs. We have several indicators that CO/XOs recognize talent at sea, 
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but it remains difficult to identify talented JOs in advance of their sea tours. Moreover, 
we note also how the FITREP may not be recording talent well. Indeed, the current 
performance evaluation process is highly rewarding to some but distressing to others, 
even in our sample frame of talented officers. 
Further, we also understand better the most important motivators and dissatisfiers 
for SWOs, which we can interrelate to significant retention risks. Indeed, several 
important factors (e.g., interaction with Chiefs, interaction with Detailers, interaction 
with CO/XOs) can be either motivational or dissatisfactory. Hence we need to understand 
which aspects of such factors are motivational and how to accentuate them. We need to 
also understand which aspects of such factors are dissatisfactory and how to mitigate 
them. However, as noted above also, not every officer blooms metaphorically at the same 
time, and the late bloomers may turn out to be our most talented mid and senior level 
leaders, hence we should move forward judiciously in terms of preferential treatment. 
Nonetheless, where we find talent and retention risk, we should act.  
4. Recommendations 
The question remains: What should we do? Our recommendations address each 
retention risk in turn. First, regarding the risk stemming from SWOs assigned to jobs that 
are not challenging, not every SWO is equally capable and motivated, so one approach is 
for the most important and challenging jobs to be assigned prudently to the most capable 
and motivated people.  
Step one—albeit arguably problematic—is to assess talent in advance of JOs’ sea 
tours. We need to know whom our talented JOs are, and it could be helpful to gain 
additional insight into talent before their first shipboard assignments. As noted above, it 
is unclear how to gain such advance insight, however, for SWO talent is situated in the 
shipboard environment. Perhaps some kind of shipboard exercise, simulation or other 
assessment—producing validated indicators of SWO talent aboard ship—can be 
accomplished during BDOC (Basic Division Officer Course), for instance, or we might 
be able to identify some other performance markers stemming from SWO testing, 
commissioning sources or like venues. This could help to mitigate the issue of talented 
officers being assigned to unfulfilling jobs in the first place. We leave this for future 
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research, however, for identifying or developing such exercises, simulations, assessments 
and markers is beyond the scope of this study. 
Additionally, early identification of talent aboard ship may find value. COs, XOs 
and DHs can identify early—say after three months at sea—talented JOs who are stuck in 
unfulfilling jobs, and likewise, they can identify untalented SWOs who are performing 
challenging jobs. Hence these ship leaders can effect some early job reassignments if they 
choose to. Navy leaders are empowered to do this now, and in practice, many of them 
probably do, but the question of consistency across various ships, commands and 
organizations remains. This may represent a promising venue for examining and 
promulgating policy, perhaps even Navy-wide. 
However, such early identification and preferential treatment may have negative 
repercussions. In addition to resentment from shipmates who are excluded from the 
“early talent club,” which seems highly likely to emerge, our Strategic Contact identifies 
another potential issue: “We need to be very careful that ‘Talent Management’ doesn’t 
turn into a popularity contest where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer. This is 
how I perceive the Air Force system – they pick their potential Generals very early and 
give them preferential treatment throughout their careers. I don’t think that is healthy for 
their organization, though.”  
Indeed, talent in the SWO Community today appears to have a strong dimension 
that focuses on past and current performance, which is rewarded strongly and directly. 
However, talent appears also to have a complementary dimension pertaining to future 
potential: an officer who performs well on his or her JO tours may not necessarily 
perform well at higher ranks on later tours (e.g., DH, XO, CO). Moreover, different 
skills, dispositions and backgrounds may contribute more to performance as a JO than in 
more senior ranks. Thus, even JOs who may not be exhibiting high performance levels in 
their early sea tours should probably be given comparable exposure to challenging jobs 
and not culled or separated too early in their careers. This would acknowledge their 
future potential and promote equity, which would likely be highly prudent given our 
systematic focus on past and current performance instead of future potential. 
Further, we could implement more consistently a policy of reassigning JOs to 
different jobs periodically during their sea tours. This could be accomplished informally 
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or via formal rotation program, and it could be accomplished via assignments to different 
ships or even aboard the same ship throughout an entire JO tour. In either case, in 
addition to giving CO/XO/DHs the opportunity to observe junior officers across a variety 
of roles, demands and requirements, it may benefit also by exposing JOs to multiple 
shipboard jobs—thereby limiting the length of time, if any, that talented people remain 
stuck in unfulfilling jobs. 
This “DivO shuffle” (P1701) is apparently common on some ships but 
unpracticed on others. Perhaps guidance can be circulated among Commodores that 
rotation of talented JOs could be deemed as “best practice” for their first sea tours. This 
would require some additional planning by the CO/XO, who would need to help mitigate 
and correct any adverse mission impacts stemming from the increased internal turnover 
caused by such job rotation, but it may help to mitigate the retention risk stemming from 
unfulfilling job assignments. 
As hinted above, another approach would be to keep officers on the same ships 
throughout their entire JO tours. Although they would serve only on a single ship, which 
they would come to understand very well, they could rotate systematically through 
different, increasingly challenging jobs as they gain experience and increase in rank. 
Newly reporting Ensigns, for instance, could be allowed—even encouraged—to have no 
formal responsibilities aside from earning their qualifications during the first part of their 
initial tours, or perhaps they could be given some collateral duties that would otherwise 
distract others with “real jobs.” This could potentially help alleviate the need to assign so 
many JOs to “made up jobs,” and it would likely accelerate qualification and increase 
both readiness and safety aboard ship. An approach along these lines would require 
considerable advance thinking and planning, which is beyond the scope of our study to 
accomplish, but it may offer potential. 
Second, regarding the risk stemming from unfavorable interaction with Chiefs, 
perhaps we could set and enforce expectations of mutual cooperation and respect between 
JOs and Chiefs. Effective JO-Chief interaction is important to successful operations in 
every division aboard ship. However, not all Chiefs appear to be equally supportive of the 
Division Officers (DivOs) for whom they work. Some inherent personality mismatches 
are likely to be inevitable, and some JOs and Chiefs may be comparably more or less 
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motivated to learn from and teach one another, respectively. Nonetheless, JOs could be 
taught and motivated to humble themselves and seek to learn from Chiefs, who in turn 
could be taught and motivated to make themselves available and strive to support DivOs. 
To the extent that such teaching and motivation fall short, and talented JOs continue to 
feel unsupported by their Chiefs, this appears to reflect a command shortcoming, which 
could be addressed at a different level (e.g., the Commodores). 
Further, as above, if COs and XOs are evaluated in part on the basis of how well 
they accomplish and lead mutually supportive relations between DivOs and Chiefs, then 
their incentives will likely align well with our objective of identifying and retaining 
talent. This appears to represent a matter of culture and policy. Perhaps “surviving” one’s 
raw encounter with unhelpful Chiefs represents a part of JO initiation—which COs, XOs, 
DHs and others likely endured during their JO tours, and which they may be likely to 
condone as a perpetuation of hazing—but to the extent that it’s unproductive and 
contributes to losing talent in the organization, such cultural practice may have outlived 
its utility. As a matter of policy, ship commanders must have the authority to ensure that 
Chiefs support their DivOs, and we recommend that they be encouraged to use it. 
Third, regarding the risk stemming from unfavorable interaction with Detailers, 
the two prominent issues noted above require different approaches. The first, lack of 
support and opportunity, appears to center on some combination of inadequate resources 
and insufficient incentive to support SWOs to the level expected. Although budgetary 
constraints may obviate opportunities to increase Detailer staffing, it may be possible to 
increase the motivation for Detailers to support and communicate with SWOs.  
For instance, perhaps we could set and enforce expectations of responsive 
interaction between JOs and Detailers. Many JOs express dissatisfaction with Detailer 
support and mistrust of the detailing process. A key manifestation of inadequate support 
appears to stem from unresponsive communication. If Detailers were instructed to 
interact more responsively, then at least the SWOs may not feel as though they are being 
ignored. This could be as simple as business rules, stating, for instance, that every SWO 
email will be responded to within two business days. A similar rule could state that an 
email will be sent to a SWO within two business days of receiving a telephone call, with 
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such email suggesting at least three possible days and times within the same week to 
schedule a telephone conversation.  
Failure on the part of Detailers to adhere to such business rules would be grounds 
for the offended SWO to escalate his or her communication to the offending Detailer’s 
superior officer, who in turn would be bound by the same business rules. This all 
assumes, of course, that the SWOs in question have begun their Detailer interactions at 
the appropriate timepoints and are not experiencing difficulties due to their own 
procrastination and inadequate planning or action. This assumes also, clearly, that 
adequate resources can be made available to support the likely increase in Detailer 
manning that would be required. 
The second, mistrust, appears to center on an absence of process transparency and 
possible goal misalignment. Were SWOs able to understand the detailing process better, 
and were they able to attain greater visibility into the larger view of jobs needing to be 
filled, then they may feel more trusting toward the detailing process and people. 
Although a SWO can have faith that the Detailer is doing his or her best to balance the 
needs of the individual with the needs of the Navy, some increased transparency may 
help to reduce his or her level of anxiety (P1701). This could potentially complicate the 
Detailers’ jobs, however, and it would likely increase the level of communication 
required of the already beleaguered detailing staff, but if such change could decrease 
SWOs’ dissatisfaction with the process, then it may contribute toward their retention.  
Fourth, regarding the risk stemming from unfavorable CO/XO interaction, 
perhaps we could set and enforce expectations of increased mentoring and coaching by 
COs and XOs. Many JOs perceive that their leaders only give orders and provide 
evaluations of recent performance, reflecting negligible motivation for sharing highly 
valued guidance and experience. This represents a challenging issue, however. COs and 
XOs are military commanders, with serious missions to accomplish in an inherently 
hazardous work environment. They require considerable latitude to do so in ways that 
make sense and that fit their leadership styles and experience bases. Nonetheless, a lack 
of guidance and mentoring, combined with toxic leadership and inhospitable command 
climate, is a strong dissatisfier for talented SWOs, and even one toxic CO/XO could 
potentially drive dozens of talented subordinates out of the Navy. Of course, COs and 
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XOs are busy people, and burdening them with additional tasks and expectations could 
become counterproductive and undermine their primary objective: effective command at 
sea. 
An alternate and possibly complementary recommendation centers on metaphoric 
“crosspollination and mentorship” for young JOs (P1704). This could be as simple as 
inviting the CO from a different ship in the DESRON to host a leadership question and 
answer session for an hour, or inviting one or more Department Heads from other ships to 
offer training or simply expand the range of social interaction with wardrooms of 
different ships. The idea is that young JOs could gain exposure to a wider variety of 
leaders—and leadership styles—from different ships, and hence benefit from the indirect, 
cross-command insight, mentoring and coaching that could emerge. 
Another recommendation centers on identifying talented JOs and providing them 
with extended access. CO/XOs, for instance, could be encouraged (e.g., by their bosses) 
to treat the most talented JOs to greater guidance and mentoring. As noted above, 
however, such preferential treatment could risk upsetting other officers who do not 
benefit accordingly, a problem that could be exacerbated through inaccurate 
identification of talent. Indeed, some of our study participants feel as though CO 
favoritism represents an issue already. We leave to future research the task of examining 
this issue and the associated recommendations more closely. 
Fifth, regarding the risk stemming from lack of early command opportunities, this 
represents a challenging issue also, for there are only so many command billets available, 
and they are probably exceeded greatly by the number of officers seeking them. There are 
likely more opportunities for early command ashore, but they would take SWOs away 
from their essential time at sea.  
One participant suggests, short of buying a bunch of tiny ships, seeking to instill a 
“culture of command” early in the wardroom: 
 
One of my COs on my first ship had what he called the ‘100% responsibility rule,’ 
meaning that he expected everyone to take total responsibility for everything that was 
going on around them. It had a way of inspiring initiative in everyone. Leading petty 
officers felt energized to lead their Sailors. Junior officers felt like they could take charge 
of their divisions, instead of just being administrators. It was a semantic shift, but it had a 
huge impact on command climate. 
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Alternatively the other aspect of dissatisfaction with command opportunities 
centers on perceived FITREP inequality, for poor evaluations are likely to limit a SWO’s 
promotion and (eventually) command opportunities. As noted above, the current system 
appears to be working well for many of the talented participants in our study, and a 
substantive change to this system (esp. that stopped favoring these participants) may 
drive such officers away from the Navy. Nonetheless, to the extent that officer 
evaluations are not based on merit, there appears to be a problem, and to the extent that 
the current evaluation process is failing to identify, promote and retain our most talented 
people, such process is likely to be ready for reexamination.  
Indeed, at the time of this writing, formal efforts to transform the performance 
evaluation process have been underway for over two years (PET Committee, 2017; NPC 
PERS3, 2016). In this present study, we are informed by the Navy Leader Development 
Framework (Richardson, 2017), which outlines a set of Navy Desired Leader Attributes 
(NDLAs). In a section below, we consider, independently, how our study participants’ 
responses compare with the NDLAs. Such attributes are intended to contribute to the 
growth of Navy leaders by describing the character qualities, behaviors and skills 
expected at different stages of their careers. By recognizing and incorporating this 
temporal dimension into the evaluation process, we can begin to focus on JOs’ future 
potential in addition to their past and current performance. This could also serve to lessen 
the perceived inequity stemming from evaluation bias favoring tenure over merit (e.g., 
people having spent more time in a command receiving higher evaluations than their 
newer shipmates, regardless of performance), and it could help to identify and retain 
talent better.  
As noted by a research colleague involved with the effort (McAnallen, 2017), “the 
PET (performance evaluation transformation) process should build a FITREP that is both 
actually and really more transparent and fair AND earns the reputation (perception) that it 
is so.  And this could/may result in bringing a new (different) group of officers into 
view/out of the middle of the pack, and yes, they may thrive more. Performance 
evaluation could also morph a bit in terms of timing. Instead of all officers being 
evaluated together—regardless of the length of time working in the evaluating command, 
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which is implicated in terms of emphasizing tenure in the command over performance—
each officer could receive periodic evaluation(s) at the same time(s) every year, and such 
evaluation(s) could morph further to emphasize career mentoring and coaching—in 
addition to performance evaluation—to a greater extent.” The PET process continues to 
emerge and remains somewhat inchoate at the time of this study, but it offers 
considerable potential to address a significant source of dissatisfaction among talented 
officers. 
Sixth, regarding the risk stemming from the rigid career timelines and family 
planning difficulties, the recently expanded number of career tracks appears likely to help 
mitigate some dissatisfying effects, and the SWO Community should be congratulated for 
devising and implementing it. Such expansion offers much greater latitude, flexibility and 
timing to officers, who can take greater control over their career paths. Nonetheless, life 
at sea—and away from family—is hard, yet it is central to the SWO profession and will 
likely persist as a source of talent loss.  
Perhaps we can think of ways to lessen the loss of time with friends and families 
while at sea. In our fathers’ and grandfathers’ Navy, people may have been content with 
reading books, writing letters, and exchanging sea stories with shipmates. In this age of 
ever increasing network bandwidth and computer connectivity, however, many JOs seek 
current, online and synchronous social interaction. Toward this end, even the smaller 
ships could be equipped with higher capacity networking capability, for instance, which 
would enable people aboard ship to have richer and more frequent communications with 
friends and families back home. 
Rich video conference, chat and social network capabilities are relatively 
common and inexpensive today, and life aboard ship could become less onerous and 
burdensome if people could stay up to date and interact with friends and loved ones using 
such capabilities. Streaming current music, games, movies and television shows could 
enhance people’s experience at sea also. Of course, this would require a budgetary 
commitment to equip ships as such, and people aboard ship would need to have sufficient 
time away from job responsibilities to enjoy activities along these lines, but enriching 
people’s off-duty time could serve us well in terms of retaining talent. 
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Perhaps we can think also of ways to increase the number and quality of activities 
that are available aboard ship. The author has spent some time living and working aboard 
warships, both in port and underway. The author has also spent some time living and 
vacationing aboard cruise ships, both in port and underway. Aside from occurring aboard 
ships, the two experiences have very little in common. Living and working aboard a 
warship had a cold, Spartan, industrial feel to it, without a wide range of activities outside 
of working, eating, exercising and sleeping. Living and vacationing aboard a cruise ship 
had a warm, luxurious, welcoming feel to it, and the wide range of activities enabled 
extensive diversion, enjoyment and entertainment.  
Warships and cruise ships clearly have different missions and are designed 
accordingly, but even small efforts to make life at sea more enjoyable and 
accommodating aboard warships could go a long way. Consider, for instance, the 
availability of more diverse, healthier meal options (Dare we use the word “cuisine”?) or 
drinking a glass or two of wine or beer at the end of the day (Such practice is permitted in 
some navies.). Either could represent a welcome ritual, and a commitment to adequate 
downtime and sleep aboard ship could pay dividends—in terms of talent retention and 
safety alike—too. 
Pregnancy is raised as a retention risk too. Perhaps we can work to support 
pregnant officers better. The risk of losing talented people to pregnancy is specific to 
women, who may become unable to finish their sea tours, and who may fear becoming 
uncompetitive relative to their peers. Some women are able to plan children around the 
pockets of shore duty that are sprinkled into their career timelines, but such pockets may 
or may not coincide with the women’s family plans or their metaphoric biological clocks, 
and some talented female officers may fear jeopardizing their careers or simply leave the 
Navy out of frustration. 
The Career Intermission Program represents one approach to addressing this 
retention risk, for it affords service members time to start families. However, apparently 
it also requires a transfer out of active duty and a pay cut, both of which can be viewed 
negatively by talented officers. An alternate approach (suggested by one of our 
participants) would propose a “yeargroup rollback system” for female officers looking to 
have children earlier than the pockets of shore duty noted above: “If a female JO were to 
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get pregnant during or before a sea tour, she could be sent to shore duty and rolled back a 
YG to stay competitive. It would be a case by case detailing process but might offer more 
flexibility to service women.”  
A related approach (suggested by another of our participants) would involve an 
effort to expand Tricare coverage to include fertility treatments for those who delay 
having kids for family planning: “This would increase the perception that the Navy takes 
care of its own, especially those who do their due diligence to balance Navy service and 
career with family planning.” Aside from these suggestions, we do not have further 
recommendations for such a challenging issue, which we leave to future research to 
address more directly and deeply. 
Finally, regarding the risk stemming from dissatisfaction with sea life, which we 
address in part above, the high stress and long hours associated with life and work aboard 
ship appear to have both functional and cultural antecedents, and we note the issue 
centering on “fallen angels” above. Functionally, much time, energy, knowledge, 
learning, coordination and attention are required to navigate, maintain and fight a ship at 
sea, and staffing limitations may center on several causes (e.g., limited berthing, budgets, 
qualified officers available for assignments). Such limitations and causes are difficult to 
address in the short term, but with some focused attention—at relatively high leadership 
levels—now may offer promise to help alleviate the corresponding retention risks in the 
future.  
Future ships could be designed to require fewer people and less time to operate 
and maintain, for instance, or their designs could emphasize additional berthing space. 
This may also contribute toward mitigating the perceived berthing disparity between men 
and women, or policy could be modified to allow greater gender cohabitation aboard 
ship. Future ship designs could also provide for greater network connectivity and 
entertainment options, perhaps integrating the raw, industrial characteristics of naval 
fleets with some amenities of cruise lines. This may contribute toward mitigating the 
perceived burden of life at sea.  
Manpower budgets could see some increases, as another instance, if this retention 
risk is deemed to be sufficiently important, and both recruiting and training pipelines 
could be expanded, as a third instance, to increase the supply of qualified officers 
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available for assignment. Alternatively, as mentioned above, if we can mitigate some of 
the dissatisfiers and increase retention rates, then we may not need to recruit so many 
Ensigns in order to hit our DH targets, and we may be able to train them more thoroughly 
before their sea tours. 
This training point merits some elaboration. JOs entering the Fleet are assigned to 
their first ships without much formal training. As characterized by one participant 
(Anonymous, 2017): 
As it is today, the SWO training pipeline does a poor job of preparing junior officers to 
assume the watch. After a brief two-month introduction at the Basic Division Officer 
Course (BDOC), they go to their ships for their first tours at sea. Ships, whose necessary 
focus is meeting operational demands, are saddled with initial training of new SWOs. 
Consequently, new junior officers are unable to concentrate their efforts on learning 
seamanship and navigation because their mental efforts are divided among administrative 
and collateral duties. 
 
Elaborating further, this officer opines: 
The root cause of the SWO community’s problems is that operational commands carry 
the greatest share of the burden for initial training. Ships, whose mission is to deploy in 
harm’s way, must take newly commissioned junior officers from a two-month 
indoctrination school and turn them into qualified mariners. Further, shiphandling, 
seamanship, and navigation occupy just two weeks of the … BDOC. As a result, there is 
no single SWO training pipeline. In practice, there are 203 individual pipelines – one for 
each surface ship. Warships have become de facto school ships, resulting in wide 
variations in training quality and added risk during real-world operations. 
 
One need to look no further than the 2017 accidents involving the cruiser 
Antietam and destroyers Fitzgerald and McCain for at least anecdotal support for this 
opinion. The study participant continues with a corresponding recommendation: 
No pilot goes to their first operational squadrons having never flown a plane. Likewise, 
no SWO should report to his or her first ship having never taken one to sea. SWOs need 
more classroom instruction in the fundamentals of seamanship and navigation, reinforced 
by underway training on yard patrol craft (YPs). With their initial training broadened in 
length and scope, their time on the bridges of warships will be spent refining already 
existing skills, instead of learning entirely new ones. This would make junior officers 
more confident, more competent, and better prepared to take the watch. 
 
Perhaps we can work to train JOs more thoroughly in advance of their sea tours. 
The relative lack of training represents an important dissatisfier. Other Navy communities 
(esp. Aviation, Nuclear) have considerable training pipelines that officers must complete 
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before their first operational assignments and before being entrusted with expensive Navy 
assets (e.g., aircraft, reactors). In its effort to get JOs out to sea quickly, the SWO 
Community may be sacrificing an opportunity to increase SWO competency levels 
aboard ship and contribute toward talent retention. 
We could consider (re)instituting a lengthy formal training program prior to the 
first sea tour, for instance, or a substantial extension of BDOC may be more efficient, as 
another instance. We could even consider affording JOs a measure of independent self-
study time to begin preparing for shipboard qualifications before the beginning of their 
sea tours. In any case, the JOs are sending a demand signal for increased training in 
advance of their first sea tours, and addressing such signal may provide manifold benefits 
in terms of retention, safety and efficacy. 
We may also have some opportunities to help address both the “fallen angels” 
issue associated with unmotivated officers at sea and the challenges of sleep at sea. In 
terms of the former, P1708, for instance, suggests that it takes far too much time and 
energy to fire such officers and separate them from the Navy. Through further follow up, 
this participant speculates that “CO's are reluctant to fire officers because it makes their 
record look worse, i.e., they can't manage their own ship and just chose to get rid of them. 
… Some officers, if they are not performing, need to be cut.” When pressed for 
recommendations, this officer suggests, “Commodores not consider [COs firing officers 
as a negative action] when rating the Captains of the ships in their squadrons.” 
Continuing, “it would have to be a gradual culture change which would be difficult to 
implement.” 
Regarding the latter, shipboard culture is likely very resistant to change, but even 
somewhat subtle shifts may help to mitigate the associated retention risks. One 
participant notes how important sleep is to both health and performance: “The SWO 
community has had a stigma about sleeping, with phrases like ‘You look well rested’ 
becoming an insult underway.” This participant comments further on fitness and nutrition 
also: “Nutrition is severely in need of review on board ship. … basically reheat and serve 
these days with a lot more brown food than green food. If we keep saying sailors are our 
most valuable asset, we should probably treat them that way.” We leave to future 
research the task of investigating sleep, nutrition, health and performance aboard ship, 
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but anyone who has driven an automobile while tired will likely attest, sleep and safety 
appear to be connected—probably particularly so on a billion dollar warship. 
Of course, much work would be required to implement recommendations along 
these lines, and it is unclear what impact they would have upon the detailing process, 
morale, perceived fairness, recruiting, chain of command, retention and other areas. 
Moreover, some of these recommendations are clearly controversial, and others would 
increase pressure on already strained budgets. Nonetheless, they offer potential to help to 
keep talented SWOs from leaving the Navy. We leave the answers to Navy leaders and 
policy makers, in addition to topics for future research.  
5. Performance Evaluation Transformation 
As noted above, formal efforts to transform the performance evaluation process 
have been underway for over two years. In this section we consider, independently, how 
our study participants’ responses compare with the Navy Leader Development 
Framework, which outlines a set of Navy Desired Leader Attributes (NDLAs). Such 
attributes are intended to contribute to the growth of Navy leaders by describing the 
character qualities, behaviors and skills expected at different stages of their careers. As 
noted above, we find that many NDLAs are mentioned—independently—as important 
character qualities, behaviors and skills by our study participants, and we find that such 
NDLAs apply at their intended target in terms of JO career progression. Here we 
elaborate on several areas of correspondence and congruence between the NDLAs and 
our interview responses. 
As a short overview of the NDLAs: They are organized according to three cadres 
(i.e., Enlisted, Warrant, Officer); and they progress from the lowest to highest ranks in 
each (e.g., E1 to E9), articulating different, cumulative, outcome expectations of service 
members as they grow, mature and progress organizationally. This captures an important 
dynamic: people change; jobs change; roles change; hence expectations should change 
also over time in an organization. For instance from the Officer Cadre, we find four 
career stages (and respective ranks): 1) Trusted Leader (O1-O2), 2) Motivational Leader 
(O3-O4), 3) Inspirational Leader (O5-O6), and 4) Visionary Leader (Flag). As 
summarized in Table 12, foundational elements are binned in four categories: 1) Core 
Values, 2) Moral Character, 3) Judgment, and 4) Leadership. 
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Table 12 NDLA Outcomes for the Officer Cadre (Adapted from Richardson, 2017) 
 
 
For a sense of how expected outcomes shift across career stages, follow the 
progression of the core values element in the first row of the table. A Trusted Leader is 
expected to understand and live the values and sentiments articulated in the Oath of 
Office and Navy Core Values. Then a Motivational Leader is also expected to instill such 
core values in others. In turn the Navy desires an Inspirational Leader to further infuse 
core values in command culture, and the goal is for Visionary Leaders to become 
guardians of Navy core values. The other foundational elements progress, cumulatively, 
in a similar manner as summarized in the table. 
Of course this table reflects only a summary, and considerable additional detail is 
articulated in the source document (Richardson, 2017). For instance, the first column (i.e., 
Trusted Leader) can be expanded to include 20 attribute statements (p. 5) as summarized 
in Table 13. The other columns include comparable additional detail as well.  
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Table 13 Expanded Attributes for Trusted Leader 
1. Understands the relationship and lives the values and sentiments articulated in the Oath 
of Office and Navy Core Values 
2. Personal values are consistent with Navy Core Values 
3. Sets a positive personal example by exhibiting truthful, ethical, and principled behavior 
on and off duty 
4. Impeccable military bearing 
5. Exhibits an enthusiastic approach to leadership with good time management and 
planning skills 
6. Achieves technical/tactical qualification 
7. Understands the value of taking care of Sailors, exhibiting a strong sense of duty to 
subordinates 
8. Invests considerable time in their Sailors’ well-being, earning their trust, respect, and 
confidence 
9. Promotes respect for every Sailor and values the diversity of all team members 
10. Displays commitment to the naval profession by proactively taking responsibility for 
the welfare and character development of others 
11. Inspires commitment in others by developing a sense of ownership in subordinates for 
the command’s mission and its successful accomplishment 
12. Fosters loyalty up and down the chain of command 
13. A results-oriented and valued team leader who can make good decisions due to their 
skills in hazard awareness and risk assessment/management 
14. Displays coolness and courage in stressful situations 
15. Places the needs of the team and the Navy above their own needs 
16. Behaves with integrity, accountability, initiative and toughness 
17. Practices sound judgment, imagination, and analytical ability in leading a division, 
enforcing rules, regulations and procedures, and managing equipment, personnel, and 
programs 
18. Sharpens written and oral communication skills and actively takes steps to strengthen 
the chain of command by fostering effective two-way communications 
19. A good listener 
20. Understands the nature and purpose of war 
 
Because our sample frame is comprised solely of participants from the Officer 
Cadre, and because all such participants are well on their way to the rank of O4 at the 
time of this study, we focus our attention to the Officer NDLAs articulated for the 
Trusted Leader (O1-O2) and Motivational Leader (O3-O4). To address correspondence 
and congruence, we focus on the participants’ interview codes analyzed above, and we 
compare such codes directly with the NDLAs applicable to participants in our sample 
frame (i.e., Trusted Leader and Motivational Leader). Wherever participants’ interview 
codes match one or more NDLAs, we make note and look for both patterns and 
omissions: attributes with considerable correspondence to participants’ comments can be 
considered to have penetrated the officer cadre at this level, whereas attributes that are 
omitted from such comments may require additional effort before they reach their 
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intended audience. For reference and comparison, we include the 11 expanded attribute 
statements for the second column (i.e., Motivational Leader) in Table 14.  
 
Table 14 Expanded Attributes for Motivational Leader 
21. Effectively translates commanding officer’s vision, intent and policies into action that 
enhances mission readiness and accomplishment 
22. Forward-looking, innovative, and judicious approach to administration and 
management of personnel, equipment, and programs 
23. Displays critical reasoning skills in problem solving, decision-making, and risk 
management 
24. Anticipates requirements and acts independently 
25. Exhibits a high degree of technical/tactical competence 
26. Influential communicator, team builder and major contributor to unit cohesion and 
esprit de corps 
27. Fosters ethical behavior in others by exercising morally responsible, credible leadership 
that is consistent with the Navy Core Values 
28. Develops the full potential of his/her people through effective delegation of authority 
commensurate with the development level of the Sailor 
29. An effective coach, counselor and mentor 
30. Models high standards of performance through personal example, self-discipline and a 
commitment to self-improvement 
31. Understands the science and art of war at the tactical level, and building a foundation 
for operational level knowledge 
 
Further, because some interview codes align with NDLAs for the Inspirational 
Leader too, we include the nine expanded attributes for the third column in Table 15. (No 
interview codes align with NDLAs for Visionary Leader.) 
 
Table 15 Expanded Attributes for Inspirational Leader 
32. A gifted communicator who inspires a shared vision within the command, by providing 
purpose, direction and motivation 
33. Embraces the authority, responsibility, and accountability of command with 
enthusiasm, selfless devotion, and total commitment to mission readiness and 
accomplishment 
34. Instills in their Sailors the warrior’s spirit and will to win 
35. Develops a positive command climate based on mutual trust, loyalty, and respect, 
resulting in unity of purpose and unparalleled esprit de corps 
36. Exercises discernment and acts boldly yet prudently in making sound decisions with 
due consideration of attendant risks 
37. Virtuous in habit, infusing Navy Core Values into the command culture 
38. The moral arbiter for the command 
39. Self-aware, innovative critical thinker, and skilled joint warfighter 




Table 16 summarizes the result of comparing NDLAs with interview codes for the 
Trusted Leader. Looking at the first entry in this table (i.e., NDLA  5), five interview 
codes correspond best to the first part (i.e., Exhibits an enthusiastic approach to 
leadership): care about the job, desire, leadership, service, and leading sailors. The one 
interview code that corresponds best with the second part (i.e., with good time 
management and planning skills) is management skills. The other entries in this table can 
be viewed and interpreted similarly. Although some correspondences between NDLAs 
and interview codes are comparatively clearer and more straightforward than others, 
given their contexts within the interview transcripts, they all map logically and sensibly, 
hence we do not include detailed discussion for each. 
 
Table 16 Code to NDLA Comparison for Trusted Leader 
NDLAs Mentioned Interview Codes 
  
5. Exhibits an enthusiastic approach to 
leadership with good time management and 
planning skills 
Management skills; care about 
the job; desire; leadership; 
service; leading sailors 
6. Achieves technical/tactical qualification Driving ships; learning; technical 
skills; sea duty 
7. Understands the value of taking care of 
Sailors, exhibiting a strong sense of duty to 
subordinates 
Helping sailors; leading sailors 
8. Invests considerable time in their Sailors’ 
well-being, earning their trust, respect, and 
confidence 
Helping sailors 
10. Displays commitment to the naval 
profession by proactively taking responsibility 
for the welfare and character development of 
others 
Helping sailors; Navy family; 
cooperate 
14. Displays coolness and courage in stressful 
situations 
Personality 
15. Places the needs of the team and the Navy 
above their own needs 
Detailers; recruiter; hard work; 
sacrifice; life at sea; stress; family 
16. Behaves with integrity, accountability, 
initiative and toughness 
Responsibility 
18. Sharpens written and oral communication 
skills and actively takes steps to strengthen the 
chain of command by fostering effective two-
way communications 
Read instructions; NPS; learning 
20. Understands the nature and purpose of war Watchstanding; WTI; warrior 
 
Interestingly, of the 20 NDLAs outlined for the Trusted Leader, we find interview 
code correspondences for exactly half of them (i.e., 10 of the 20). Referring back to Table 
 65 
13 for reference, we see that NDLAs 1-4, 9, 11-13, 17 and 19 do not have corresponding 
interview codes. As noted above, attributes that are omitted from participants’ comments 
may require additional effort before they reach their intended audience. 
Table 17 summarizes the result of comparing NDLAs with interview codes for the 
Motivational and Inspirational Leader. Here we find correspondences with seven of the 
11 Motivational attributes and two Inspirational attributes. The same caveat noted above 
applies here (i.e., attributes that are omitted from participants’ comments may require 
additional effort before they reach their intended audience).  
 
Table 17 Code to NDLA Comparison for Motivational & Inspirational Leader 
NDLAs Mentioned Interview Codes 
  
21. Effectively translates commanding officer’s 
vision, intent and policies into action that enhances 
mission readiness and accomplishment 
Innovation 
25. Exhibits a high degree of technical/tactical 
competence 
Do the job; driving ships; watchstanding; 
technical skills; sea duty; fun; challenging; 
real job to do 
26. Influential communicator, team builder and 
major contributor to unit cohesion and esprit de 
corps 
Management skills; cooperate 
28. Develops the full potential of his/her people 
through effective delegation of authority 
commensurate with the development level of the 
Sailor 
Chiefs; JO experience; not enough people; 
leading sailors 
29. An effective coach, counselor and mentor Helping sailors; teach 
30. Models high standards of performance through 
personal example, self-discipline and a 
commitment to self-improvement 
Education; NPS; adaptable; learning; care 
about the job 
31. Understands the science and art of war at the 
tactical level, and building a foundation for 
operational level knowledge 
Do the job; driving ships; watchstanding; 
technical skills; WTI; important 
35. Develops a positive command climate based on 
mutual trust, loyalty, and respect, resulting in unity 
of purpose and unparalleled esprit de corps 
Command climate 
39. Self-aware, innovative critical thinker, and 
skilled joint warfighter 
Adaptable; innovation 
 
We should remind the reader that participants in our sample frame are not 
expected to exhibit characteristics of the Inspirational Leader at this stage of their careers, 
but two such NDLAs do have corresponding interview codes: 35 (i.e., Develops a 
positive command climate based on mutual trust, loyalty, and respect, resulting in unity 
of purpose and unparalleled esprit de corps) and 39 (i.e., Self-aware, innovative critical 
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thinker, and skilled joint warfighter). The first merits some elaboration, for it is unlikely 
that any of our study participants has been in a position to develop a positive command 
climate, for instance. Nonetheless, many of them note its importance and comment on the 
effects of both positive and negative examples.  
In all, we find considerable correspondence between NDLAs and participants’ 
interview responses, suggesting that SWOs at the O3 level accept and exhibit many 
desired attributes of Navy leaders at their career phase. This is encouraging, and it 
reflects visionary leadership of the Flag Officers developing the NDLAs. Navy 
Leadership should be encouraged to find such good correspondence with its desired 
attributes. In a sense, our results provide independent evidence that the NDLAs are 
considered important and being exhibited at the appropriate time in a SWO’s career. 
Further investigation could help to elucidate why a number of NDLAs do not 
correspond with interview codes, for as noted repeatedly above, attributes that are 
omitted from participants’ comments may require additional effort before they reach their 







V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this section we conclude the technical report with summary recapitulation of 
the key points discussed in the body above, which we follow with suggestions for future 
research along the lines of this investigation. 
 
A. CONCLUSION 
The Navy Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) Community provides a vital, 
sophisticated capability to address increasingly dynamic and unpredictable threats around 
the world. Effective performance in the SWO Community requires a somewhat unique 
set of skills and capabilities, which center on life and work aboard ships at sea. Many 
SWOs find life at sea to be fun and exciting, filled with challenging jobs and 
camaraderie, and a balance that makes the hard work and long hours worthwhile and 
rewarding. Alternatively, for others the sacrifice seems unsustainable, and the SWO 
Community has battled mid- and junior-level officer attrition for many years. 
To help combat such attrition, Community leaders have devised and implemented 
a number of progressive changes to enhance the SWO profession and to help retain 
talent. For several instances, it has recently increased its Department Head Retention 
Bonus, increased compensation to officers selected early for Department Head, and 
organized a number of alternate, parallel career tracks to expand flexibility and options 
regarding sea-shore rotation, education, specialization and other decisions affecting 
retention.  
The goal is to retain, develop and promote the most talented SWOs. The construct 
talent remains somewhat ambiguous, however, and the most “talented” officers appear to 
be those receiving the highest rankings and strongest endorsements on their fitness 
reports (FITREPs). A key problem is, FITREPs are subject to increasing criticism 
regarding bias, subjectivity and foci on tenure over merit and current performance over 
future potential. Indeed, the Navy is in the process of reevaluating its performance 
evaluation process now. Moreover, results from our previous research suggest strongly 
that talent is a highly situated and nuanced concept, with key characteristics likely to 
differ with rank, role, job and other factors that vary over time. Hence it remains 
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uncertain whether the talent we retain currently is the best to meet our present, much less 
our future, needs. 
 This qualitative study addresses the issue directly through three research 
questions: 1) What constitutes talent in the SWO Community? 2) Why do some talented 
people choose to leave the Navy while others choose to stay in? 3) How can we retain 
talent in the Navy? 
Eschewing the idea of using deduction and quantitative analysis through one or 
more top-down theoretic models of talent—approaches that presume a detailed 
understanding of what talent is and how to measure it—we choose instead to employ 
qualitative methods inductively and to build up a grounded understanding of SWO talent. 
Indeed, given the situated and nuanced nature of talent likely to exist, we look to develop 
and articulate an understanding by talking to talented people in the SWO Community 
directly. We all know the saying, “I know talent when I see it,” so we’re looking to 
understand what it is that talented SWOs see when it comes to talent.  
Likewise, instead of speculating about why some people are leaving the SWO 
Community and why others are deciding to stay in the Navy, we ask talented SWOs why 
they’re choosing or considering one path or another, and we ask them also about friends 
and colleagues of theirs, building up similarly a grounded understanding of what they are 
looking for or missing. Far from informal wardroom conversations, broad focus groups or 
like approaches, however, we employ very well-established, grounded theory building 
methods, which provide a systematic, scientific process to develop an understanding 
inductively, from the data themselves. 
Moreover, we focus specifically on people who have completed their junior 
officer (JO) tours, who have been identified as “talented” beyond the current FITREP 
process, and who have made the commitment (i.e., as O3s) to their Department Head 
(DH) tours. This represents a career decision point at which much SWO talent is lost 
historically, hence the perspective of talented officers at this point is highly informative.  
Through independent analysis, we find considerable correspondence between 
participants’ interview responses and the set of Navy Desired Leader Attributes 
(NDLAs), suggesting that SWOs at the O3 level accept and exhibit many desired 
attributes of Navy leaders at their career phase. This is encouraging, and it reflects 
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visionary leadership of the Flag Officers developing the NDLAs. Navy Leadership 
should be encouraged to find such good correspondence with its desired attributes. In a 
sense, our results provide independent evidence that the NDLAs are considered important 
and being exhibited at the appropriate time in a SWO’s career. 
Additional results suggest that the SWO Community is working very well overall, 
that its recently implemented changes are serving their intended purposes, and that many 
talented people are being identified, recognized, promoted and retained as desired. 
Nonetheless, this community is no exception to having room for improvement, and 
through our grounded, independent study, we identify seven significant retention risks: 1) 
talented people not being assigned to challenging jobs; 2) unfavorable interaction with 
Chiefs; 3) unfavorable interaction with Detailers; 4) unfavorable CO/XO interaction; 5) 
lack of command opportunities; 6) difficult family planning; and 7) dissatisfaction with 
sea life. 
Each of these retention risks offers potential for mitigation, and through our 
grounded understanding of the SWOs participating in the study—in addition to sage 
comment and guidance from the experienced SWO Captain serving as our Strategic 
Contact—we offer a set of eight recommendations to help address such risks and to retain 
talent. 
1. Work to assess talent in advance of JOs’ sea tours. We need to know whom our 
talented JOs are, and it could be helpful to gain additional insight into talent before their 
first shipboard assignments. Perhaps some kind of shipboard exercise, simulation or other 
assessment—producing validated indicators of SWO talent aboard ship—can be 
accomplished during BDOC (Basic Division Officer Course), for instance, or we might 
be able to identify some other performance markers stemming from SWO testing, 
commissioning sources or like venues. This could help to mitigate the issue of talented 
officers being assigned to unfulfilling jobs in the first place. 
Additionally, we could implement more consistently a policy of reassigning JOs 
to different jobs periodically during their sea tours. This could be accomplished 
informally or via formal rotation program, and it could be accomplished via assignments 
to different ships or even aboard the same ship throughout an entire JO tour. In either 
case, in addition to giving CO/XO/DHs the opportunity to observe junior officers across a 
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variety of roles, demands and requirements, it may benefit also by exposing JOs to 
multiple shipboard jobs—thereby limiting the length of time, if any, that talented people 
remain stuck in unfulfilling jobs.  
2. Set and enforce expectations of mutual cooperation and respect between JOs 
and Chiefs. Effective JO-Chief interaction is important to successful operations in every 
division aboard ship. However, not all Chiefs appear to be equally supportive of the 
Division Officers (DivOs) for whom they work. Some inherent personality mismatches 
are likely to be inevitable, and some JOs and Chiefs may be comparably more or less 
motivated to learn from and teach one another, respectively. Nonetheless, JOs could be 
taught and motivated to humble themselves and seek to learn from Chiefs, who in turn 
could be taught and motivated to make themselves available and strive to support DivOs. 
To the extent that such teaching and motivation fall short, and talented JOs continue to 
feel unsupported by their Chiefs, this appears to reflect a command shortcoming, which 
could be addressed at a different level (e.g., the Commodores). 
3. Set and enforce expectations of responsive interaction between JOs and 
Detailers. Many JOs express dissatisfaction with Detailer support and mistrust of the 
detailing process. A key manifestation of inadequate support appears to stem from 
unresponsive communication. If Detailers were instructed to interact more responsively, 
then at least the SWOs may not feel as though they are being ignored. This could be as 
simple as business rules (e.g., “every SWO email will be responded to within two 
business days”; “an email will be sent to a SWO within two business days of receiving a 
telephone call”). This all assumes, of course, that the SWOs in question have begun their 
Detailer interactions at the appropriate timepoints and are not experiencing difficulties 
due to their own procrastination and inadequate planning or action. This assumes also, 
clearly, that adequate resources can be made available to support the likely increase in 
Detailer manning that would be required. 
Further, SWO mistrust of the detailing process appears to center on an absence of 
process transparency and possible goal misalignment. Were SWOs able to understand the 
detailing process better, and were they able to attain greater visibility into the larger view 
of jobs needing to be filled, then they may feel more trusting toward the detailing process 
and people. Although a SWO can have faith that the Detailer is doing his or her best to 
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balance the needs of the individual with the needs of the Navy, some increased 
transparency may help to reduce his or her level of anxiety. 
4. Set and enforce expectations of increased mentoring and coaching by COs and 
XOs. Many JOs perceive that their leaders only give orders and provide evaluations of 
recent performance, reflecting negligible motivation for sharing highly valued guidance 
and experience. This represents a challenging issue, however. COs and XOs are military 
commanders, with serious missions to accomplish in an inherently hazardous work 
environment. They require considerable latitude to do so in ways that make sense and 
that fit their leadership styles and experience bases. Nonetheless, a lack of guidance and 
mentoring, combined with toxic leadership and inhospitable command climate, is a 
strong dissatisfier for talented SWOs, and even one toxic CO/XO could potentially drive 
dozens of talented subordinates out of the Navy. Of course, COs and XOs are busy 
people, and burdening them with additional tasks and expectations could become 
counterproductive and undermine their primary objective: effective command at sea. 
An alternate and possibly complementary recommendation centers on metaphoric 
crosspollination. This could be as simple as inviting the CO from a different ship in the 
DESRON to host a leadership question and answer session for an hour, or inviting one or 
more Department Heads from other ships to offer training or simply expand the range of 
social interaction with wardrooms of different ships. The idea is that young JOs could 
gain exposure to a wider variety of leaders—and leadership styles—from different ships, 
and hence benefit from the indirect, cross-command insight, mentoring and coaching that 
could emerge. 
5. Reevaluate the performance evaluation process. Many junior officers seek to 
distinguish themselves through early command, in large part because they do not feel 
well represented by their evaluations, yet they seek to “practice” command in smaller, 
less stressful settings (e.g., something less demanding than as CO of a DDG) also. There 
are two issues here: 1) early command and 2) the performance evaluation process. 
Addressing early command first, since there is only a fixed number of command 
billets, it’s unclear how many smaller or “practice” commands could be established. It’s 
unclear also whether serving as CO of such smaller or “practice” command would 
represent a better experience than serving as a key Department Head or XO under a more 
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experienced CO. We leave this question to Navy leaders and policy makers, in addition to 
a topic of future research. 
In terms of FITREP reevaluation, at the time of this writing, formal efforts to 
transform the performance evaluation process have been underway for over two years. In 
a section above, we consider, independently, how our study participants’ responses 
compare with the Navy Desired Leader Attributes (NDLAs). Such attributes are intended 
to contribute to the growth of Navy leaders by describing the character qualities, 
behaviors and skills expected at different stages of their careers. By recognizing and 
incorporating this temporal dimension into the evaluation process, we can begin to focus 
on JOs’ future potential in addition to their past and current performance. This could also 
serve to lessen the perceived inequity stemming from evaluation bias favoring tenure 
over merit (e.g., people having spent more time in a command receiving higher 
evaluations than their newer shipmates, regardless of performance), and it could help to 
identify and retain talent better. This represents an area of ongoing research. 
As noted above, we find that many NDLAs are mentioned—independently—as 
important character qualities, behaviors and skills by our study participants, and we find 
that such NDLAs apply at their intended target in terms of JO career progression. Navy 
Leadership should be encouraged to find such good correspondence with its desired 
attributes. In a sense, our results provide independent evidence that the NDLAs are 
considered important and being exhibited at the appropriate time in a SWO’s career.  
6. Continue to offer the recently expanded number of career tracks. This appears 
to help address some risk stemming from rigid career timelines and family planning 
difficulties, and the SWO Community should be congratulated for devising and 
implementing it. Nonetheless, life at sea—and away from family—is hard, yet it is 
central to the SWO profession and will likely persist as a driver of talent loss. This 
recommendation blends with Number 8 below but merits mention here first. 
Perhaps we can think of ways to lessen the loss of time with friends and families 
while at sea. In our fathers’ and grandfathers’ Navy, people may have been content with 
reading books, writing letters, and exchanging sea stories with shipmates. In this age of 
ever increasing network bandwidth and computer connectivity, however, many JOs seek 
current, online and synchronous social interaction. Toward this end, even the smaller 
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ships could be equipped with higher capacity networking capability, for instance, which 
would enable people aboard ship to have richer and more frequent communications with 
friends and families back home. 
Rich video conference, chat and social network capabilities are relatively 
common and inexpensive today, and life aboard ship could become less onerous and 
burdensome if people could stay up to date and interact with friends and loved ones using 
such capabilities. Streaming current music, games, movies and television shows could 
enhance people’s experience at sea also. Of course, this would require a budgetary 
commitment to equip ships as such, and people aboard ship would need to have sufficient 
time away from job responsibilities to enjoy activities along these lines, but enriching 
people’s off-duty time could serve us well in terms of retaining talent. 
Perhaps we can also expand our vision in terms of ways to increase the number 
and quality of activities that are available aboard ship. One need spend only a short 
amount of time on a cruise ship, for instance, to appreciate the dramatic difference 
between it and a cruiser or destroyer. Cruise ships and warships clearly have different 
missions and are designed accordingly, but even small efforts to make life at sea more 
enjoyable and accommodating aboard warships could go a long way. Consider, for 
instance, the availability of more diverse, healthier meal options (Dare we use the word 
“cuisine”?) or drinking a glass or two of wine or beer at the end of the day (Such practice 
is permitted in some navies.). Either could represent a welcome ritual, and a commitment 
to adequate downtime and sleep aboard ship could pay dividends—in terms of talent 
retention and safety alike—too. 
7. Work to support pregnant officers. The risk of losing talented people to 
pregnancy is specific to women, who may become unable to finish their sea tours, and 
who may fear becoming uncompetitive relative to their peers. Some women are able to 
plan children around the pockets of shore duty that are sprinkled into their career 
timelines, but such pockets may or may not coincide with the women’s family plans or 
their metaphoric biological clocks, and some talented female officers may fear 
jeopardizing their careers or simply leave the Navy out of frustration. 
 Although the Career Intermission Program represents one approach to addressing 
pregnancy as a retention risk, it has limitations and consequences (e.g., transfer out of 
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active duty). An alternate approach (suggested by one of our participants) could involve a 
“year group rollback system” for female officers looking to have children earlier than the 
pockets of shore duty noted above. If a female JO were to get pregnant before or during a 
sea tour, for instance, then perhaps she could be sent to shore duty and rolled back a year 
group to stay competitive. It would likely require consideration of circumstance and merit 
for each individual case, but an approach along these lines might offer more flexibility to 
service women.  
A related approach (suggested by another of our participants) would involve an 
effort to expand Tricare coverage to include fertility treatments for those who delay 
having kids for family planning. This represents emerging best practice to retain talent in 
tight labor markets (WSJ, 2018), and it could increase the perception that the Navy takes 
care of its own, especially those who do their due diligence to balance Navy service and 
career with family planning. 
8. Finally, train JOs more thoroughly in advance of their sea tours. The relative 
lack of training represents an important dissatisfier. Many JOs perceive that the formal 
(ashore) training received before their sea tours is inadequate, and several participants in 
this study mention the 2017 accidents involving the cruiser Antietam and destroyers 
Fitzgerald and McCain for at least anecdotal support for this perception. After only a 
brief BDOC experience, new JOs go directly to their ships for their first operational tours 
at sea. Other Navy communities (esp. Aviation, Nuclear) have considerable training 
pipelines that officers must complete before their first operational assignments and before 
being entrusted with expensive Navy assets (e.g., aircraft, reactors). In its effort to get 
JOs out to sea quickly, the SWO Community may be sacrificing an opportunity to 
increase SWO competency levels aboard ship and contribute toward talent retention.  
We could consider (re)instituting a lengthy formal training program prior to the 
first sea tour, for instance, or a substantial extension of BDOC may be more efficient, as 
another instance. We could even consider affording JOs a measure of independent self-
study time to begin preparing for shipboard qualifications before the beginning of their 
sea tours. In any case, the JOs are sending a demand signal for increased training in 
advance of their first sea tours, and addressing such signal may provide manifold benefits 
in terms of retention, safety and efficacy. 
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Of course, much work would be required to implement the recommendations 
outlined above, and it is unclear what impact they would have upon the detailing process, 
morale, perceived fairness, recruiting, chain of command, retention and other areas. 
Moreover, some of these recommendations are clearly controversial, and others would 
increase pressure on already strained budgets. Nonetheless, they offer potential to help to 
keep talented SWOs from leaving the Navy. We leave the answers to Navy leaders and 
policy makers, in addition to topics for future research.  
 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Indeed, through this study we have already identified several promising future 
research topics. More specifically, each of the recommendations proposed above can 
benefit from research to consider alternate approaches and to outline key decisions and 
implementation steps. For one, recall from above how we consider ways to assess talent 
in advance of JOs’ sea tours, and we note how some kind of shipboard exercise, 
simulation or other assessment—producing validated indicators of SWO talent aboard 
ship—can be accomplished during BDOC, or how we might be able to identify some 
other performance markers stemming from SWO testing, commissioning sources or like 
venues. A study to address the corresponding research questions could be enlightening. 
For another, recall from above also how we consider ways to implement more 
consistently a policy for reassigning JOs to different jobs periodically during their sea 
tours (e.g., informally, formal rotation program, assignments to different ships, aboard 
the same ship throughout an entire JO tour). Likewise, examining how to rotate JOs 
systematically through different, increasingly challenging jobs as they gain experience 
and increase in rank (e.g., allowing newly reporting Ensigns to have no formal 
responsibilities aside from earning their qualifications during the first part of their initial 
tours, giving them some collateral duties that would otherwise distract others with “real 
jobs”). 
For a third, addressing how to improve JO-Chief interaction represents a question 
that could be addressed through further research, as could examining how to improve JO-
Detailer interaction. Likewise, investigating ways to set and enforce expectations of 
increased mentoring and coaching by COs and XOs could be highly illuminating, as 
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could understanding better how to identify and address toxic leaders in the Fleet—
especially in advance of them becoming COs and XOs. Even alternate approaches such 
as metaphoric “crosspollination and mentorship” for young JOs, in addition to the 
controversial idea of providing them with extended access to CO/XOs, could be informed 
by follow on study. 
As a fifth, recall the question from above regarding the extent to which serving as 
CO of a smaller or “practice” command would represent a better experience than serving 
as a key Department Head or XO under a more experienced CO. Addressing this question 
could produce valuable insight in terms of officer development, promotion, reward and 
retention. 
Additionally, we mention above how we are aware of formal efforts to transform 
the performance evaluation process (esp. via the Navy Leader Development Framework 
and constituent NDLAs). Through this study we are in a good position already to 
examine performance evaluation, and we could likely contribute very well through 
additional qualitative and quantitative research. Other important topics (e.g., rigid career 
timelines, family planning difficulties, challenges of life at sea, being away from friends 
and family, pregnancy, training, health and sleep) merit further investigation as well.  
Finally, we also have opportunities to expand this study in three directions: 1) 
other communities, 2) other groups, and 3) longitudinally. Toward the first, to date we 
have studied the Information Warfare Community and Surface Warfare Community, both 
with insightful and impactful results. A very promising opportunity for future work could 
apply these same qualitative research methods to other warfare communities (e.g., 
Aviation, Submarine, Special Warfare) and even to other Navy communities beyond 
warfare (e.g., Supply, Legal, Medical). Further, this study focuses on the Officer 
Community, but the enlisted ranks offer great promise for examination too. The search 
for talent knows no bounds, so every community stands to benefit from the kind of 
insights that can be elucidated through research along these lines. 
Toward the second, we focus this study on a specific group of JOs (e.g., O3, 
completed their JO tours, selected for and agreed to DH tours, attending the NPS). The 
study of other, complementary and contrasting groups could provide additional insight. 
For instance, all of the participants in this study elected to complete graduate education at 
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the NPS for their shore assignment. There are other officers—ostensibly with equal or 
even superior talent—who elected different shore assignments (e.g., supporting Fleet 
shore commands) that may illuminate the study with both similar and different 
characteristics and considerations. For another instance, all of the participants in this 
study have been identified as “talented.” There are other officers—potentially with 
different talents—who were not identified as such that may help to inform the study 
through comparison and contrast. For a third instance, all of the participants in this study 
have elected to stay in the Navy. There are other officers—ostensibly with equal or even 
superior talent—who elected to leave the Navy that may likewise help to inform the study 
through additional comparison and contrast. For a final instance, all of the participants in 
this study have attained the same rank (O3). Talent seems highly likely to vary across 
rank among other factors. It may be further illuminating to study how the nature of talent 
shifts with rank, particularly in comparison with the NDLAs, which shift with rank also. 
Likewise with year group: even among JOs, we may find some variation in what 
constitutes talent across JOs from different year groups. 
Toward the third, we study talent at one point in time. It could be highly 
informative to examine how talent, motivators, dissatisfiers and like factors change over 
time for these same participants. This could help to elucidate which aspects are relatively 
stable longitudinally versus those that are more ephemeral. Perhaps Navy Leadership can 
safely ignore ephemeral factors that will be mitigated on their own, while paying 
particular attention to their stable counterparts. This same longitudinal direction of future 
research can also be applied to all of those above (e.g., other communities, enlisted ranks, 
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APPENDIX A – RECRUITMENT SCRIPT 
This is the script used to recruit volunteers to participate in the study. 
 
Hello, [Senior SWO] referred me to you and other 11XX officers here at NPS regarding a 
qualitative study that I’m leading to gain insight into how to treat and retain talented 
officers in the Surface Warfare Community. Through consultation with OPNAV N1, we 
have identified this community as particularly important and dynamic at present, and our 
conversations with surface warfare experts suggest that it could benefit from improvements 
in how it assigns, promotes and retains talented officers. When you have a convenient 
opportunity, kindly let me know if we could set up a time to chat—either in person or by 
telephone, Skype or like means—for a half hour or so. Your input will be anonymous, and 
nothing in our report will identify you in any way. Indeed, I will shred the participant list 
when the study is complete, so you are welcomed and encouraged to be candid. We’re 
looking for information and insight from within the community, and the timing looks good 
in terms of interest at N1. 
 
Thank you in advance for your consideration. Please let me know if you have any questions 
or concerns. 
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APPENDIX B – BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire is used to collect background information prior to interviews. 
 
Background Data  
Please fill in as many fields as you are able. Your information will remain confidential. 
 
1. Date of Commissioning (YYMM): _______ 
 
2. Commissioning source  (check field that applies):  
USNA __ ROTC __ OCS_OTS  __    Direct __    Other Commissioning Source ____  
 
3. Prior Enlisted (check field that applies):   Yes __  No __ 
 
4. Undergraduate College attended: _________________ 
 
5. Year of graduation from college (YYMM): ______ 
 
6. College Major:___________________ 
 
7. Undergraduate GPA: _____  
 
8. Do you hold a graduate degree?  (check field that applies):   
 Yes __  No ___  .  If Yes, in what major (specialty) ? ______ 
 
9. Rate at commissioning: _______________ 
 
10. Designator at entry (check the field that applies): SWO ___  Submarine ___ Special 
Warfare/EOD ___ Aviator ___ RL ___ Staff____ ; If RL, what designator code?____ 
 
11. Married, at commissioning date (check field that applies):   Yes __  No __ 
 
12. Dependent children, at commissioning date (check field that applies):   Yes __  No __ 
 
13. Married, at current date (check field that applies):   Yes __  No __ 
 
14. Dependent children, at current date (check field that applies):   Yes __  No __ 
  
15. Current rate: _____  
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APPENDIX C – COMMON INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
All participants are asked these 10 questions to provide a common basis.  
 
Research Interview Questions 
 
Introduction 
“Thank you again for participating in the study on retaining talent in the Surface Warfare 
Community. You were identified among a pool of NPS surface warfare students, and I 
selected you along with several others for your potential to inform our study well. As a 
note, your comments will be kept anonymous, no personal details about you will appear 
in the study report or briefings, and only you and I will know that you participated in the 
study. Once you sign the consent form, I’ll ask you a few relatively open ended 
questions, which I hope that you’ll answer candidly. The interview should take 30 to 45 
minutes, but we can go longer if you wish. Do you have any questions? Are you ready to 
begin?” 
General Questions (presuming all subjects are Navy service members still) 
1. What led you to join the Navy? 
2. Can you tell me about how your career has progressed to this point? 
3. What was your last assignment, and where do you hope to be assigned next? 
4. What do you like most about your work in the Navy? What do you like least? 
5. When is your next decision point regarding whether to stay in the Navy or not? 
6. What factors are pulling you to stay in the Navy, and what are pulling you away? 
7. At this point, do you anticipate staying in or leaving the Navy? Why? 
8. What if anything would have to be different for you to change your mind? 
9. Is there anything else that you can tell me to help understand your motivation? 
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